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ABSTRACT 
Naval Special Warfare does not currently have a 
designated career path for an officer that requires 
professional military education (PME) for SEAL junior 
officers after the rank of Ensign (O-1) and before the rank 
of Lieutenant Commander (O-4).  There currently is interest 
in this subject matter at the Naval Special Warfare Command 
and Center.  SEAL officers increasingly hold key leadership 
positions and influence critical decisions in the execution 
of national strategy.  This growing responsibility calls for 
a progressive and sequential education program to prepare 
junior officers for battle, staff, and command.  
Additionally, the Naval Special Warfare Officer corps will 
continue to grow in the coming years, adding more junior 
officers to the community.  SEAL junior officers would 
benefit from structured PME throughout their careers.  
Through research analysis and a survey of Naval Special 
Warfare officers this thesis attempts to determine what 
education is critical for a SEAL junior officer.  
Additionally, this thesis attempts to determine the most 
efficient way to address education shortfalls and the 
frequency in which education should be experienced. Finally, 
the Naval Special Warfare junior officer community will 
benefit from education opportunities inserted into the 
officer career path to address nineteen specific subjects 
indicated in this research. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Naval Special Warfare does not have a pipeline for 
education after Basic Underwater Demolition/SEAL (BUD/s) 
training and the Junior Officer Training Course (JOTC) 
normally received as an Ensign (O-1 pay-grade).  A survey 
regarding professional development for SEAL officers was 
administered to SEAL officers ranging from Ensign (O-1) to 
Commander (O-5). This survey resulted in a 28% return.  From 
this survey, the researcher concluded that the Naval Special 
Warfare junior officer community will benefit from education 
opportunities inserted into the officer career path to 
address nineteen specific subjects.  A mandatory SEAL 
Lieutenants Career Course (SLCC) for officers aspiring to 
command a SEAL platoon would address education shortfalls 
and better prepare a junior officer for command and staff at 
all levels.  This SLCC program would sufficiently address 
education shortfalls within the mandated primary education 
window between the ranks of Ensign and Lieutenant.  
Additionally, the SEAL community would be wise to emphasize 
and take advantage of all levels of education to include 
pre-commissioning opportunities, courses of instruction 
offered by institutions such as the Joint Special Operations 
University (JSOU) and the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in 
order to maximize SEAL relevancy in accordance with the 
evolving modern conflict.      
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I. OVERVIEW OF NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE AND THE 
CURRENT SEAL OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY 
EDUCATION PIPELINE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Global War on Terror is taking the U.S. military 
into both familiar and uncharted waters.  Nearly everyday, 
new challenges arise both on the battlefield and in the 
staff-room.  Officers of all services are gaining levels of 
combat and staff experiences that rival any other time in 
our nation’s history.  Unfortunately, many lessons are being 
continually relearned, forgotten, ignored or simply 
dismissed.  Timely, relevant education can stop that trend 
by allowing military members to reflect on past experiences 
and apply knowledge and thought to future concepts.  All 
organizations should constantly reinforce institutional 
knowledge concerning their own system, neighboring systems, 
and competitive systems.  In terms of U.S. national policy, 
it is not sufficient for the Department of Defense (DoD) to 
exclusively understand itself and the enemy.  Progress will 
be stifled without a sufficient knowledge base that includes 
adjacent friendly and coalition organizations, enemy and 
hostile organizations, and (more importantly) how those 
organizations interact prior to, during, and after battle.  
Today’s Naval Special Warfare (SEAL) Officers are fully 
engaged in the Global War on Terror—from the tactical level 
far behind enemy lines to local naval bases, from enlisted 
sailors to the most senior commands at the strategic level 
directing joint force employment.  Surprisingly, Naval 
Special Warfare (NSW) does not currently have a progressive 
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and sequential professional military education pipeline to 
prepare its officers for the future.  Such a pipeline would 
better prepare SEAL officers for combat, command, staff, and 
senior leadership positions.  
B. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE PLAYS AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT 
ROLE IN MODERN STRATEGY, CONFLICT, AND LEADERSHIP  
Naval Special Warfare Officers are increasingly manning 
key leadership positions.  Ten years ago, many in the SEAL 
community would never have imagined a four-star admiral in 
their ranks.  Most recently, as noted by Bottoms and LeBeau 
(2007) in the Special Operations Command publication Tip of 
the Spear, a SEAL officer was promoted to the rank of 
Admiral and appointed the eighth Commander of U.S. Special 
Operations Command.  The commander, Admiral Eric Olson, has 
commanded in nearly every facet of Naval Special Warfare, 
operated with the United Nations, served in the joint 
environment and on conventional Navy staffs.  Admiral Olson 
also received a graduate degree from the Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, California, in National Security Affairs.  
Admiral Olson’s rise to lead arguably the most important 
major command fighting the Global War on Terror demonstrates 
the contribution of the Naval Special Warfare community; it 
is now represented at the highest level of military command.  
U.S. Special Operations Command’s mission statement, as seen 
on the unclassified official SOCOM webpage (2007), describes 
the enormous responsibility and authority bestowed to 
Admiral Olson: “USSOCOM leads, plans, synchronizes, and as 




networks. USSOCOM trains, organizes, equips and deploys 
combat ready Special Operations Forces to combatant 
commands.”  
In addition to Admiral Olson, SEAL officers serve in 
various high commands and high-profile positions. The 
unclassified official Special Operations Command, Europe, 
Leadership webpage (2007) provides a short biography for the 
commander of all of the Special Operations forces in Europe 
and most of Africa.  Rear Admiral (Upper Half) William 
McRaven, also a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School, 
commands Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR). 
SOCEUR’s webpage (2007) also highlights Admiral McRaven’s 
extensive responsibilities.  SOCEUR, subordinate to the 
Commander, U.S. European Command, is responsible for “SOF 
readiness, targeting, exercises, plans, joint and combined 
training, NATO/partnership activities, and execution of 
counterterrorism, peacetime and contingency operations.”  As 
noted in the Leadership webpage (2007), Admiral McRaven also 
commanded at every level in Naval Special Warfare, served as 
the Deputy Commanding General for Operations at the Joint 
Special Operations Command and at the Office of Combating 
Terrorism on the National Security Council.  His education 
has undoubtedly led to his success within the Naval Special 
Warfare community and the military at large. 
Both Olson’s and McRaven’s positions highlight the fact 
that Naval Special Warfare officers must be trained and 
educated in order to command warfighters at every level.  
According to Admiral McRaven, (1995) “[b]oldness, courage, 
perseverance, and intellect unquestionably have their place 
in combat, but as the theory shows, they must exist in 
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harmony with the principles of special operations in order 
to achieve success” (p. 391).  Education plays as important 
a role in an officer’s professional development as every 
other aspect of leadership. 
C. OVERVIEW OF NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE  
1. Naval Special Warfare Organization 
Naval Special Warfare (NSW) is a dynamic and versatile 
organization with roots in the United States Navy, yet which 
currently maintains unequivocal ties to all of the military 
services. Navy SEALs operate in a joint environment, and are 
often the first into battle alongside other special 
operations counterparts.  The U.S. Navy Special Warfare 
unclassified Homepage (2007) describes the basic 
organization of the Navy SEALs:  
NSW provides a versatile, responsive and 
offensively focused force with continuous 
overseas presence. The major operational 
components of Naval Special Warfare Command 
include Naval Special Warfare Groups ONE and 
THREE in San Diego, CA, and Naval Special Warfare 
Groups TWO and FOUR in Norfolk, VA. These 
components deploy SEAL Teams, SEAL Delivery 
Vehicle Teams, and Special Boat Teams world wide 
to meet the training, exercise, contingency and 
wartime requirements of theater commanders.  With 
approximately 5,400 total active-duty personnel—
including 2,450 SEALs and 600 Special Warfare 
Combatant-craft Crewmen (SWCC)—NSW forces are 
busier than ever answering "911 calls" from 
around the globe. (2007)  
Given the job description of U.S. Navy SEALs and their 
supporting personnel under the current global situation, it 
is no doubt that Naval Special Warfare is busier than ever.  
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Navy SEALs are currently executing overt and clandestine 
operations across the globe, and there seems to be no 
shortage of activity in the near future.   
2. Naval Special Warfare Missions 
SEAL is an acronym for Sea, Air and Land, describing 
the environments in which SEALs are trained and equipped to 
operate.  Missions can range from direct combat to 
information warfare and psychological operations.  Today’s 
SEALs not only operate under, on, and near the water, but 
also high on remote mountains and deep in desolate deserts.  
SEALs work hand-in-hand with fellow Navy personnel, other 
U.S. military services, as well as personnel from other 
government agencies and nations. U.S. Naval Special 
Warfare’s unclassified Missions (2007) webpage describes the 
missions of the SEAL community:     
A tactical force with strategic impact, NSW 
mission areas include unconventional warfare, 
direct action, combating terrorism, special 
reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, 
information warfare, security assistance, 
counter-drug operations, personnel recovery and 
hydrographic reconnaissance. Although NSW 
personnel comprise less than one percent of U.S. 
Navy personnel, they offer big dividends on a 
small investment. (2007) 
In this information and media age, it is important for 
a force such as Naval Special Warfare to maintain the 
highest standards of training, education, and combat 
readiness due to the increasing speed in which political and 
military events unfold.  Given the complex and joint nature 
of modern warfare, Naval Special Warfare leaders must be 
ready to lead small, clandestine teams in both the most 
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arduous missions and isolated locales; these teams must be 
equipped to perform in conjunction with the highest levels 
of national and military strategy and policy.  An overview 
of Naval Special Warfare’s recent accomplishments accents 
the difficult and politically sensitive nature of SEAL 
operations. 
3. Naval Special Warfare Modern History 
Since the Navy SEAL Teams were commissioned in 1962, 
Navy SEALs have operated in every major conflict in which 
the United States has been involved.  Navy SEALs gained 
their reputation as fierce warriors and adaptive combatants 
in the jungles of Vietnam.  SEALs have conducted combat 
operations in conflicts involving Lebanon, Grenada, Panama, 
Desert Shield/Storm, and the Balkans.  More recently, as 
noted in the Naval Special Warfare unclassified History 
(2007) webpage:  
In response to the attacks on America Sept. 11, 
2001, Naval Special Warfare forces put operators 
on the ground in Afghanistan in October. The 
first military flag officer to set foot in 
Afghanistan was a Navy SEAL in charge of all 
special operations for Central Command. 
Additionally, a Navy SEAL captain commanded 
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force 
(CJSOTF) South. Commonly referred to as Task 
Force K-BAR, the task force included U.S. Navy, 
Army, Air Force and Coalition SOF forces.  
Naval Special Warfare has played a significant 
role in Operation Iraqi Freedom, employing the 
largest number of SEALs and SWCC in its history. 
NSW forces were instrumental in numerous special 
reconnaissance and direct action missions 
including the securing of the southern oil 
infrastructures of the Al Faw peninsula and the 
off-shore gas and oil terminals; the clearing of 
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the Khawr Abd Allah and Khawr Az Zubayr waterways 
that enabled humanitarian aid to be delivered to 
the vital port city of Umm Qasr; reconnaissance 
of the Shat Al Arab waterway; capture of high 
value targets, raids on suspected chemical, 
biological and radiological sites; and the first 
POW rescue since WWII. Additionally, NSW is also 
fighting the war on terrorism in other global hot 
spots including the Philippines and the Horn of 
Africa. 
NSW is committed to combating the global 
terrorist threats. In addition to being experts 
in special reconnaissance and direct action 
missions, the skill sets needed to combat 
terrorism; NSW is postured to fight a dispersed 
enemy on their turf. NSW forces can operate from 
forward-deployed Navy ships, submarines and 
aviation mobility platforms as well as overseas 
bases and its own overseas units. (2007) 
It is clear that Naval Special Warfare is committed to 
excellence and service to the nation.  SEALs and supporting 
units are in harm’s way on a daily basis, expertly and 
successfully executing strategically important missions 
across the globe.  A simple question remains: how much more 
successful could Naval Special Warfare be if its officers 
subscribed to a progressive, sequential professional 
military education series?  
D. THE IMPORTANCE OF EDUCATION IN NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE 
1. SEAL and Special Operations Education Today 
The importance of education cannot be overstated.  It 
is assumed that most academics, statesmen, and military 
leaders would agree that a strong knowledge base is critical 
to success in any endeavor.  From where then, in the Special 
Operations community, and more specifically within Naval 
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Special Warfare, does that education come?  Is education 
best obtained through a formal school environment or from 
on-the-job training and experience?  The answer is probably 
somewhere in between. CDR (RET) Brad Voigt, SEAL, USN, 
Officer Career Management and Skills Development Manager for 
the Naval Special Warfare Command, Center for SEAL and SWCC, 
collected unclassified excerpts from Naval Special Warfare 
After-action Reports (AARs) as one substantiation for this 
research.  These AARs from current Naval Special Warfare 
combat deployments often describe a lack of officer 
preparedness when personnel are faced with unfamiliar joint, 
staff, or liaison (LNO) roles.  From these AARs, however, 
few details of specific shortfalls are provided.  Some 
examples of comments include:   
• November 2004: No recurring leadership development 
training for Officers and Chiefs.   
• November 2005: [Task Unit] leaders must be 
proficient at CO level joint operations.   
• April 2006: Without a defined Officer ProDev… 
Recommendations, however, are lacking when it comes to 
addressing problem areas (CDR Voigt, personal 
correspondence, February 7, 2007).  In other words, it 
appears that officers in the SEAL community recognize the 
need for and importance of implementing some kind of formal 
education pipeline.  The difficulty arises in determining 
the true nature of the problem and then how to implement a 
solution in an already busy and combat-laden career path.  
This thesis will attempt to provide the Commander, Naval 
Special Warfare with a solution to this potential impasse. 
In addition to this internal frustration, there have 
been critical comments made by external observers. Perhaps 
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if SEALs emphasized education as much as training, combat 
readiness, and combat deployments, there would be less room 
for criticism from outside the community.  In an article for 
Armed Forces Journal, Martin N. Murphy (2007) described the 
desirability of and challenges posed to a U.S. naval civil 
affairs and counterinsurgency force.  Murphy provided 
interesting insight into the benefits of such a specially 
trained force, and accurately points out the possible 
integration of Naval Special Warfare.  Murphy, however, 
failed to capture the essence of the SEAL mission. He 
asserts:  
[Counterinsurgency] is not a SEAL mission.  
[SEALs] have evolved in a different direction.  
They are warriors, trained and equipped to 
conduct covert insertion reconnaissance and 
sabotage missions.  Their young age profile means 
that in most cases they lack the maturity needed 
to be effective in the ambiguous world of long-
term unconventional warfare. (2007, p. 22) 
As the Naval Special Warfare Community Manager 
Commander Paul Giberson notes, the actual average age of an 
enlisted SEAL is 32.  SEAL enlisted personnel are also 
exceptionally educated.  In fact, over 16% of SEAL enlisted 
operators have advanced education with at least an 
associate’s degree (CDR Giberson, personal correspondence, 
September 11, 2007).  Additionally, nearly all SEALs now 
have combat experience.  Why, then, would Murphy suggest 
SEAL officers and enlisted are not the right force for 
counterinsurgency?  Though counterinsurgency should not be a 
mission solely for SEALs, it is most certainly within the 
SEAL mission set and capability.  Some would argue that 
there are none more qualified in the Navy.  How then, does 
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Naval Special Warfare educate SEAL officers in 
counterinsurgency and other forms of asymmetric warfare?  
How can Martin Murphy be convinced that SEALs are, and have 
been, up to the counterinsurgency task?  The answer is 
education.  
Understanding the scope of military education 
requirements is a substantial task in and of itself.  
Organizational design experts Lee G. Bolman and Terrence E. 
Deal (2003) comment on the energy involved in self- 
evaluation: “[a]ssessing the performance or productivity of 
individuals, departments, or programs is a major 
undertaking.  Evaluation consumes substantial time, effort, 
and money” (p. 281).  So, rather then spend time arguing 
against Martin N. Murphy and his article, the Naval Special 
Warfare community should be in a constant state of self-
evaluation in order to determine the best and most efficient 
way to combat an elusive, transnational enemy.  Luckily, the 
SEAL community places stock in future challenges and not in 
past successes.  Indeed, lessons learned, both positive and 
negative, help shape the force of tomorrow.  So, too, then 
should lessons learned apply to education.  Is the SEAL 
community educating its officers adequately and properly?  
The only way to answer that question is to execute what 
Bolman and Deal (2003) refer to as a major undertaking and 
continue the exercise of internal evaluation.  
The current Joint Chief of Staff, Admiral Mullen 
(2006), when serving as the chief of Naval Operations, 
remarked on the importance of a time for education in an 
officer’s career path.  At the Naval War College in Newport, 
RI, Admiral Mullen stated:  
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[The Naval War College] is a place—an 
environment, really—that permits military 
officers the time to think and read about the 
past and future.  Time to plan, time to write, 
and time to prepare themselves for higher 
responsibilities which will come very rapidly. 
(2006)  
As Admiral Mullen takes the helm as the Chief Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, his sage advice echoes the criticality of 
officer education at any level.  Especially considering the 
high operations tempo that nearly all junior officers in any 
service maintain, Admiral Mullen stresses the importance of 
professional reflection and a time for learning and critical 
analysis on conducting the operational art of war.   
2. The Joint Special Operations University 
Educational Requirements Analysis  
The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) is the 
education component of the Special Operations Command.  
According to JSOU’s unclassified official webpage (2007), 
its mission is to:  
[E]ducate Special Operations Forces executive, 
senior, and intermediate leaders and selected 
other national and international security 
decision-makers, both military and civilian, 
through teaching, research, and outreach in the 
science and art of Joint Special Operations. 
(2007)  
As part of JSOU’s educational refinement, Booz Allen 
Hamilton, Inc., (2005) submitted an exceptionally detailed 
and enlightening report to the Joint Special Operations 
University in Hurburt, Florida, in order to evaluate the SOF 
education process.  The Executive Summary (2005) captured 
the central purpose and themes of the study: “This study 
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[focused] on the education component of those USSOCOM 
responsibilities and the changes that should be made in 
joint SOF education to prepare SOF personnel at every level 
to face the challenges of the post-9/11 world” (2005, p. 1).   
The report “is the result of an independent study by 
Booz Allen Hamilton and identifies the general educational 
themes and processes necessary for the joint SOF community 
to succeed in the face of global challenges” (2005, p. 1).  
The methodology of the study included both interviews and a 
survey of SOF personnel.  “The survey targeted active and 
retired mid- to senior-level SOF leaders, as well as current 
and former JSOU students.  A total of 1,167 respondents 
returned surveys” (2005, p. 4).  Many of the findings by the 
independent study mirror educational issues within this 
thesis research.  It appears that Naval Special Warfare is 
not the only SOF component that is conducting internal 
assessments of educational needs, requirements, and future 
goals.   
The JSOU report indicated that the SOF community relies 
on service schools to professionally educate its officer 
corps.  Special Operations Command does, in fact, control 
forces from all four of the major services, but each service 
maintains career-specific requirements for promotion.  “In 
the area of professional education, that meant a reliance on 
Service and joint professional military education (PME) 
opportunities designed for traditional Service career 
development and promotion profiles, with only limited 
alternatives being provided by USSOCOM” (Booz Allen 
Hamilton, 2005, p. 2).  Despite the fact that USSOCOM does 
not have its own service-school equivalent, and that most of 
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the service schools are not SOF specific, Special Operations 
Forces continue to perform on the battlefield in an 
extraordinarily manner:    
Data collection revealed near-universal agreement 
across the joint SOF community that the current 
joint SOF is exceptionally well trained in 
individual and organizational skills.  However, 
the study also determined that the same force is 
not well prepared for integrated planning or 
force application at the operational and 
strategic levels of warfare. (2005, p. 2)   
The SOF community executes well, but could be better 
prepared to understand the impacts of operations and how to 
better shape future operations.  Perhaps a better-prepared 
force would exceed current expectations, goals, and 
requirements. 
E. THE CURRENT EDUCATION SYSTEM FOR SEAL JUNIOR OFFICERS 
1. SEAL Junior Officer Training Course (JOTC) 
Naval Special Warfare junior officers currently attend 
the SEAL Junior Officer Training Course (JOTC) after 
completing Basic Underwater Demolition SEAL (BUD/s) school.  
As stated in a Naval Special Warfare Training Course Control 
document (2006, March), the JOTC course “is designed to 
prepare NSW Junior Officers with the knowledge and skills to 
more effectively fulfill their prospective positions within 
the SEAL community” (2006, p. 2).  The stated focus of 
knowledge “within” the SEAL community is deficient.  Not 
only must officers intimately know their profession, they 
are expected to be familiar with the joint environment. The 
Department of Defense and the joint agency arena expect 
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officers to be masters of their profession and to carry an 
understanding of other military and civilian entities, even 
at the most junior positions.  At the primary education 
level described by the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Instruction 1800.01C (2005), primary education should be 
experienced through the ranks of O-3 and include tactical 
and operational instruction. JOTC, however, is the only 
formal block of instruction in Naval Special Warfare at the 
time of this writing.  As per the CJCSC Instruction 1800.01C 
(2005), SEAL Ensigns (O-1’s) through Lieutenants (O-3’s) are 
expected to have awareness in Joint Warfare Fundamentals and 
Joint Campaigning, as well as be tactical experts in their 
branch fields. The JOTC syllabus (2005) suggests many key 
subject areas receive minimal attention:   
• USSOCOM History and Organization: 30 minutes 
• Agencies: 1.5 hours   
• Joint Special Operations Command and Control:  1.5 
hours   
• Military Decision-making Process:  1.5 hours 
• Support and Coordination Planning:  1.5 hours  
Though JOTC is designed as an introduction into Special 
Operations, for many SEAL officers, these single hour-and-a-
half formal blocks of instruction are the only such blocks 
officers receive until they complete the required JPME-1 at 
the O-4 pay-grade—which could come as late as the twelve- or 
fourteen-year mark in an officer’s career.  However, as an 
officer progresses from Ensign to Lieutenant Commander, 
he/she will undoubtedly tap into this type of information 
time and time again, regardless of his/her assignment within 
or external to the Special Operations community.  What is 
missing in the SEAL officer career path is a period of 
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instruction to refocus and reaffirm the principles of Naval 
Special Warfare, modern Special Operations, and the joint 
and inter-agency environment.  Such instruction must occur 
when junior officers are executing Special Operations in 
support of national objectives and strategy.  The best time 
for such a period for a SEAL lieutenant (O-3) would be prior 
to taking command of a SEAL platoon.  This continuum would 
give the SEAL officer both the Junior Officer Training 
Course (JOTC) and at least one overseas deployment in order 
to gain critical on-the-job training and experiences.  Such 
a timeline would result in a solid Special Operations base 
of knowledge prior to a SEAL O-3 primary level school.  At 
this time in an officer’s career, he would have had time to 
digest the lessons of JOTC and see those principles in real-
world environments.  This perspective would heighten the 
value of any follow-on curriculum and better prepare that 
officer for tactical command, staff, and liaison duties. 
The current SEAL officer education continuum dictates 
that officers receive education at the earliest stages—
through JOTC.  After JOTC, a SEAL officer is not required to 
attend any educational institution or complete any 
educational requirements until the rank of Lieutenant 
Commander (O-4), at which point an officer is directed to 
fulfill the JPME-1 requirement. The JSOU main report (Booz 
Allen Hamilton, 2005) highlighted similar concerns about 
education preparedness throughout the entire Special 
Operations community.  Finding number Eight indicates that 
any education, regardless of SOF application, can often come 
too late: 
When SOF leaders were asked to comment on their 
SOF education and experiences, the first theme to 
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emerge was that more and earlier joint, 
interagency, and multinational education should 
be available and that the education should be 
timed to precede key assignments in which those 
competencies would be necessary.  The major 
issue, as expressed by study participants, was 
that primary PME for officers and enlisted 
personnel is scheduled against Service career 
progression models.  Consequently, relevant PME 
topics for SOF leaders are often available too 
late in their careers. (2005, p. 38)   
As in the Naval Special Warfare community, educational 
opportunities tend to come much later in an SOF Officer’s 
career path; yet, most tactical action—with often 
operational and strategic implications—happens at relatively 
junior ranks.  A key line from the above JSOU finding reads, 
“education should be timed to precede key assignments in 
which those competencies would be necessary” (2005, p. 38).  
While JOTC prepares SEAL officers for entry-level roles and 
responsibilities, it is not sufficient to prepare officers 
for an assignment as a SEAL Platoon Commander (Lieutenant, 
O-3) operating in a joint and coalition environment.  The 
JSOU report captures a similar problem set in the “Late to 
Need” diagram below: 
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Force Management
 
Figure 1.   “Late to Need” Diagram, JSOU Report 
(From Booz Allen Hamilton, 2005, p. 39) 
 
The “Late to Need” diagram illustrates the fact the 
service schools usually come too late, considering the roles 
and responsibilities of junior officers on the modern 
battlefield.  In essence, the problem with the current 
service-wide professional military education system is that 
it is not SOF-specific.  Additionally, the education, even 
though not related to SOF, is coming too late in an 
officer’s career path in view of the duties and 
responsibilities exhibited in junior officer ranks.  A major 
difference between the Naval Special Warfare officer 
education path and that illustrated in the “Late to Need” 
diagram, however, is that both the CJCSC 1800.01C and the 
JSOU report assume a service school will be offered during 
the O-3 pay grade.  This is accurate for the Army’s 
Captain’s Career Course, the U.S. Marine’s Expeditionary 
Warfare School, and the Air Force’s Squadron Officer School.  
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SEAL officers, however, are not required to attend such a 
school, nor does one specifically exist.   
Regardless of the fact that service schools appear too 
late and are not SOF specific, for the other services, the 
O-3 schooling at least provides a common ground for officers 
prior to their advancing to grades normally associated with 
mid- to higher-level command and staff.  SEALs are not 
required to attend such a school or institution for 
advancement or general knowledge.  Some SEAL officers will 
pursue advanced degrees on their own; some will successfully 
complete JPME requirements on-line; and a few officers will 
attend the Naval Postgraduate School relatively early in 
their careers.  However, these options appear to be the 
exception, not the rule.  A majority of SEAL officers will 
not have attended a service school of any kind at the O-3 
level—either resident, on-line, or through distance 
learning.  This fact indicates that after the Junior Officer 
Training Course, unless education is pursued at an 
individual level, all other education will be obtained be 
“on the job” until a SEAL officer completes the required 
block of JPME-1.  This situation is unacceptable given the 
nature of the current conflict, and considering the complex 
threats that the United States faces daily.  A need and 
requirement exists to address the lack of education for SEAL 
junior officers operating in the global arena. 
2. Current SEAL Platoon Leadership Seminar 
Naval Special Warfare currently offers a one-week SEAL 
Platoon Leadership Seminar of instruction taught at the 
Naval Special Warfare Center.  This course is mainly 
designed to allow some senior leaders to impart values and 
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lessons learned to SEAL junior officers preparing to take 
command of a SEAL platoon.  While this course is a step in 
the right direction, it is not designed or able to educate a 
junior officer in the complex requirements of the modern 
battlefield.  A review of the one-week syllabus (Naval 
Special Warfare Center, 2007, March) quickly demonstrates 
that crucial areas associated with a modern warfighter are 
not covered, nor could be in such a short period of time.  
This current structure, however, could easily be 
incorporated into a longer, more in-depth program to better 
educate SEAL junior officers. 
A SEAL junior officer must be systematically and 
professionally prepared in order to execute the roles and 
responsibilities expected in staff and command on the battle 
field of today.  A program must be created to address 
shortfalls in officer education.  Prior to that programs 
creation, however, those areas of improvement must be 
clearly identified so the right solutions can be 
implemented.  The following chapter will focus on the SEAL 
officer survey in order to specifically identify areas that 
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II. SEAL OFFICER PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 
SURVEY METHODS AND RESULTS 
A. THE IMPORTANCE OF ORGANIZATIONAL SELF-EVALUATION 
1. The Need for Change   
It is safe to say that the Special Operations community 
has been regularly engaged in the Global War on Terror since 
September 11, 2001.  Tactics, techniques, and procedures 
have matured, been validated, adjusted, and combat-tested 
again and again.  Forces have grown, and special operations 
leaders are increasingly called upon for critical analysis 
of national and military strategy.  There appears to be a 
constant global spotlight on special operations leaders in 
various roles.  The attacks on September 11th caused a 
period of forced change in the Special Operations community; 
they catalyzed a reanalysis of how business was, is, and 
will be conducted.  Organizational analysts Bolman and Deal 
(2003) reflect on the requirement for modernization during 
times of change.  “It seems simplistic to point out that 
investment in change calls for collateral investment in 
training.  Yet countless initiatives falter because managers 
neglect to spend time and money on developing necessary new 
knowledge and skills” (2003, p. 370). 
As Bolman and Deal point out, education is not simply a 
good idea; education is mission-critical.  
An environment filled with complexity, surprise, 
deception, and ambiguity makes it hard to extract 
lessons for future action.  Yet an increasingly 
turbulent, rapidly shifting environment requires 
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contemporary organizations to learn better and 
faster just to survive. (2003, p. 27)   
This description of the environment can easily be seen 
through the lens of the asymmetric conflict in which the 
U.S. military is currently involved.  Therefore, the Naval 
Special Warfare community must learn faster and better than 
our enemies, or there will be a heavy price to pay on the 
battlefield. 
Special operations officers are often responsible for 
significant amounts of equipment, funding, and extremely 
well-trained personnel.  Therefore, there is a heavy 
reliance on the institutions and individuals responsible for 
training and educating the officer and the operator.  In the 
SOF community, the line between officer and operator is 
never as transparent as in the ranks of junior officers.  
Navy SEALs are not an exception.   
B. EDUCATION AS A SYSTEM 
1. An Insurgency Model as an Example 
Enemies of the United States are assumed to be 
conducting training and education to determine the best ways 
to circumvent U.S. military power.  There is usefulness in 
comparing the educational system of an insurgency to that of 
our modern professional officers’ career path. In a RAND 
study titled Rebellion and Authority, Nathan Leites and 
Charles Wolf, Jr. (1970) describe an insurgency as a system.  
The 3rd step in the insurgent system is a conversion 
mechanism in which the rebellion “tends to organize 
personnel, financial, logistics, intelligence, 
 23
communications, and operations branches to manage the 
conversion of inputs into activities” (1970, pp. 34-35).  
According to the system, in order to achieve success, the 
insurgency must have a plan that includes the transformation 
and adaptation of raw materials into effective outputs to 
further the cause.  In Leites and Wolf’s (1970) example, the 
personnel identified for insurgent activity are the raw 
materials.  For the insurgent, there is a requirement for 
economy of force since resources may be fleeting.  If the 
enemy is transforming and adapting according to the modern 
situation, so then should the Naval Special Warfare 
community. 
Naval Special Warfare could take a similar approach to 
the educational system for officers.  More of the right 
education is better than simply more education.  In a time 
of high operational tempo, it is important that leaders 
afford junior officers the opportunities to reflect on 
lessons learned in the field, share those ideas with peers 
and academic or subject matter experts, contemplate new and 
inspiring ways to tackle future conflicts, and then return 
to the field with fresh and innovative perspectives.  One of 
the purposes of the SEAL officer survey was to determine 
what facets of education are currently the most important in 
regards to the modern conflict.  Critical thinking and 
innovation has always been a SOF hallmark.  Instilling and 
fostering that trait early in a SEAL officer’s career path 
can be accomplished through education.   
2. Training and Experience versus Education 
Commander Matt Stevens (2007) recently wrote a master’s 
thesis at the Marine Corps University, Command and Staff 
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College, entitled The Missing Link: Professional Military 
Education in the Navy SEAL Officer Corps.  Commander Stevens 
offers a multitude of recommendations to address the 
shortfalls in Naval Special Warfare professional military 
education.  He makes a distinction between training and 
education that is often misunderstood by senior military 
leaders and is worth noting. He explains: 
In essence, training is more concerned with 
teaching a person or unit what to think, what to 
do and how to do it.  Training is skill oriented 
and reflexive.  Shooting a weapon or running a 
battle-staff are products of training.  
Education, on the other hand, is reflective and 
emphasizes how to think. (2007, pp. 4-5)   
Understanding the value of operational experience, 
leadership must measure education by its enhancement of that 
experience.  As the idiom goes, you don’t know what you 
don’t know. 
Most SEAL officers that participated in the SEAL 
officer survey indicated that a majority of their education 
and training had been through on-the-job experiences.  While 
there is merit to learning in an operating environment, 
initial training and education in the form of BUD/S, and 
JOTC are required before becoming a qualified SEAL officer.  
Subsequently, there should similar attention given to 
education requirements as an officer is promoted through the 
military ranks.  As rank and responsibility increases, so 
does the complexity of the operational environment.  
Therefore, more time is required to prepare for often 
ambiguous and complicated tasks and situations.  Again, the 
JSOU main report (2005) focused on the heart of this issue.  
Finding number 21 reported:  
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Although operational experience (a component of 
applied learning) can be an effective teacher, 
many expressed the belief that reliance on it 
exclusively was inefficient in developing 
critical competencies and led to longer ramp-up 
times in educating joint SOF leaders.  This 
exclusive dependence on operational experience 
leaves individuals to rely on trial and error and 
places additional burdens on field commanders. 
(2005, p. 58)  
The JSOU report (2005) Finding number 24 continued to 
highlight the reliance on the SOF community to concurrently 
learn while executing operations:  
According to a large majority of stakeholder 
interviews and focus group engagements, current 
joint SOF leadership has not been specifically 
educated to fight the GWOT.  Rather, it continues 
to rely on its traditional strength of adapting 
to operational challenges and learning informally 
on-the-job. (2005, p. 61)   
The SOF community, and specifically Naval Special 
Warfare, should take advantage of time and institutions to 
train and educate personnel prior to an emersion into the 
deployed environment.  Another option would be to create a 
SEAL Lieutenants Career Course to address shortfalls.  This 
would cut back on the time required to “learn” the job, as 
well as limit the loss of operational momentum usually 
associated with military turnover.  SEAL officers new to a 
job, position, or staff often need time to gain situational 
awareness and knowledge of the operating environment.  Much 
of this time could be cut down if the SEAL officer already 
had more institutional knowledge. 
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C. NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE SURVEY PARTICIPANTS AND 
INFORMATION-GATHERING METHODS 
1. Participants 
The SEAL officer professional military education survey 
(See Appendix 1) was conducted with the Naval Special 
Warfare Center for SEAL and SWCC to obtain information 
regarding Naval Special Warfare education and training.  
Appendix 1 contains a copy of the survey, with minor changes 
to better match the format of the on-line, paper, and 
electronic version.  Through the Naval Special Warfare 
Command, a standard Navy message (See Appendix 3) was 
forwarded to all SEAL commands announcing the voluntary 
survey.  The survey was open to all SEAL officers between 
and including the ranks of Ensign (O-1) to Commander (O-5).  
In addition to dispersing the official message, the author 
traveled to SEAL commands in Hawaii, San Diego, and Virginia 
to administer a paper copy of the survey.  In addition, the 
Center for SEAL and SWCC sent an e-mail to the community 
leadership toward the end of the survey window (24 May, 2007 
to 31 July, 2007) as a reminder that the survey was still 
available.  During the survey window, there were a total of 
129 responses out of 450 possible SEAL officers between the 
ranks of O-1 and O-5 (See figure 2).  That return 
represented a 28% sample of the total SEAL officer 
population between the ranks of Ensign (O-1) and Commander 
(O-5).  SEAL officers offered frank and honest opinions 
regarding professional military education and training and 
were enthusiastic about the study.  Support from the Naval 
Special Warfare Command and the Naval Special Warfare Center 





Figure 2.   Naval Special Warfare Officer Survey 
Participants by Rank 
 
Participants included those willing to take the survey. 
This generally includes those not currently deployed to a 
combat theater, those stationed where they would receive 
regular official message traffic, and those not on temporary 
duty during the time of command visits by the author.  Every 
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all SEAL officers between O-1 and O-5.  Participants 
represented a clear cross-section of the community, with a 
greater percentage of the respondents coming from the O-3 to 
O-5 ranks. 
2. Data Collection Methods and Survey Design 
Three methods for taking the SEAL Officer Professional 
Development survey were available.  First, participants 
could log onto the Center for SEAL and SWCC secure web-page 
and take an on-line version.  Second, an e-mail version was 
available to SEALs in remote locations or to those that did 
not have access to the Center for SEAL and SWCC secure web-
page.  E-mailed versions were sent either to CDR (RET) Brad 
Voigt USN, the director of the Center for SEAL and SWCC, or 
to the author, LCDR Thomas Donovan.  Third, the final method 
of participation was through a paper version of the survey 
administered by the author at various SEAL commands on 
predetermined dates.  63 responses came on-line, 38 via e-
mail, and 32 from the paper version.  Six surveys came in 
after the window and were not included in the data analysis. 
The SEAL officer survey asked a series of questions, 
with responses composed of a five-point scale that included 
Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither Agree or Disagree, Disagree, 
and Strongly Disagree.  Subjects were broken into four major 
domains.  The first domain contained subjects of a tactical 
nature, which included mission planning.  This domain also 
included questions regarding tactical skill-sets that asked 
how training was obtained: either on-the-job (OJT) or 
formally.  A five choice response set was used, ranging from 
100% OJT, 75% OJT/25% Formal, 50% OJT/50% Formal, 25% 
OJT/75% Formal, or 100% Formal.  For purposes of analysis, 
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answers to these questions were coded as a five point scale.  
The second domain focused on educational topics using only 
the five-point Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree scale.  
The third domain comprised three “short answer” questions 
asking the participants to comment on areas related to SEAL 
officer education, training, and preparedness.  The fourth 
domain repeated domains one and two, without the OJT - 
Formal sub-question.  This final domain asked SEAL 
Lieutenant Commanders (O-4’s) and Commanders (O-5’s) to 
evaluate the officers under their command in the same skill 
sets and educational attributes as domains one and two.  The 
survey took roughly 30 minutes to complete. 
Every effort was made to accurately transfer data from 
written and e-mailed surveys into the web based survey data 
set.  Additionally, the transfer of the final data set to 
MINITAB (1998) for analysis was reviewed and scrutinized to 
limit possible error.1 
                     
1 On one occasion, for only the on-line version of the survey, an 
instruction line in the heading of questions 18a through 18k was 
reversed.  Specifically, “strongly agree” was incorrectly indicated to 
respond with a 1, and conversely “strongly disagree” with a 5.  This 
heading instruction, however, was checked by the fact that the actual 
responses for each question (18a through 18k) were followed by the 
correct answer scale both in number and word form: “strongly agree” with 
a 5, through “strongly disagree” with a 1. It seemed highly unlikely to 
the student and the advisor that subjects would ignore the clearly 
labeled scale on the screen in favor of their memory of an instruction 
in a previous heading.  This belief seemed confirmed when the researcher 
discussed the issue with three survey participants who had noted the 
discrepancy; all of these participants answered according to the correct 
scale.  Furthermore, the discrepancy was noted and corrected within the 
first two weeks of the survey window.  It also only appeared in the on-
line version.  Given the fact that the survey discrepancy existed for a 
short time, was only in the heading and not in the actual response 
location, was only in the on-line version, and the actual response 
locations were of the correct scale and correctly interpreted by at 
least three participants, the error is considered to have had a 
negligible impact on the results.  In addition, the SEAL officer survey 
results parallel those of the JSOU (2005) survey.  The researcher and 
his advisor maintain the strongest confidence in the survey results and 
analysis. 
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Results of the survey were collected and compiled by 
the staff at the Center for SEAL and SWCC under the 
direction of CDR (RET) Brad Voigt.  The compiled data were 
then sent to the author for analysis. 
The only demographic used for the SEAL officer survey 
was an individual’s rank.  Rank was considered to be the 
best way to break out the significance of specific subjects 
in relation to an officer’s time within Naval Special 
Warfare.  Additionally, rank as the single demographic 
eliminated some complexities in analyzing themes across the 
Naval Special Warfare junior officer spectrum.    
Questions one through 22 were open to all SEAL officers 
between the ranks of O-1 and O-5 and had a possible 129 
responses. Questions 23a through 24o focused on SEAL O-4’s 
and O-5’s and had 57 possible responses.  Omitted from the 
below results table are the written responses in questions 
19-21. 
The SEAL officer survey was approved by the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s (NPS) Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
Protection of Human Subjects (as seen in Appendix 4). 
D. SURVEY RESULTS 
The SEAL officer survey clearly demonstrated 
operational issues within the Naval Special Warfare 
Community that would benefit from more professional 
education.  First and foremost, when asked how training and 
education was received, most SEAL officers (regardless of 
rank) overwhelmingly responded that on-the-job training was 
the primary source of instruction.  This is an important 
observation considering that SEAL officers have varying and 
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distinct career paths.  It would be hard to determine which 
officers learned what, during which experience, and from 
whom?  For example, a Lieutenant (O-3) operations officer 
with staff experience in the Philippines would have 
different “on-the-job” training and education than that of a 
Lieutenant (O-3) operations officer in Iraq. Likewise, if 
these two were compared to a non-deploying operations 
officer, all three would have different lessons learned and 
experiences to pass on to junior officers later in their 
careers.  The end result is that officers have on-the-job 
experiences that apply to specific scenarios, but those 
experiences may be less useful when the officer is presented 
with different circumstances.  Figure 3 indicates that much 
of what a SEAL officer learns today comes from on-the-job 
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Most of my SEAL education and training 
has been in a formal school-house 
environment.
Most of my SEAL education and 
experience has been on-the-job 
training (OJT).
 
Figure 3.   Formal versus On-the-Job Training among Naval 
Special Warfare Officers O-1 through O-5 
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1.   Rank Analysis 
The data analysis was conducted using MINITAB software 
(release 12, The student edition of MINITAB for Windows 
software, 1998).  Additionally, basic statistics were also 
derived using MINITAB.  Respondents were authorized to skip 
questions.   
Table 1 (also seen in Appendix 2) presents the basic 
statistical analysis from the SEAL officer survey.  For each 
item, measures of central tendency – the Mean, Median, and 
Mode – are presented, along with a measure of dispersion – 
the standard deviation.  In addition, the p value resulting 
from a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) with Rank as the 
independent variable is presented.  Relationships according 
to rank were considered significant using α = 0.10 if mean 
differences among rank were significantly different at p < 
0.10 level.  Highlighted are the p-values < 0.10: 
    
 
Question Response       Standard   
Number out of 129 Mean Median Mode Deviation P-Value 
1 129 2.2016 2 2 0.9793 0.556 
2 129 4.2558 4 4 0.8318 0.934 
3 129 4.4651 5 5 0.5869 0.785 
3a 129 3.876 4 4 0.9763 0.332 
3b 128 3.5859 4 4 0.9351 0.358 
4 128 3.8984 4 4 1.0487 0.791 
4a 129 3.8372 4 4 0.8731 0.059 
4b 129 3.1705 3 3 0.7616 0.043 
5 126 4.1587 4 4 0.7737 0.395 
5a 129 4.0388 4 4 0.922 0.156 
5b 127 3.5039 4 4 0.7546 0.464 
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6 124 3.6935 4 4 0.9892 0.076 
6a 125 4.248 5 5 0.9559 0.071 
6b 126 3.3651 3 3 0.7332 0.534 
7 127 2.976 3 2 1.172 0.657 
7a 127 4.6457 5 5 0.7403 0.145 
7b 127 3.2126 3 3 0.752 0.917 
8 127 3.102 3 4 1.194 0.515 
8a 129 4.7132 5 5 0.7725 0.168 
8b 129 3.2558 3 3 0.8128 0.819 
9 127 3.7559 4 4 1.0135 0.305 
9a 129 4.0775 4 5 0.9405 0.172 
9b 129 3.0388 3 3 0.7438 0.09 
10 127 3.1575 3 4 1.1228 0.196 
10a 129 4.2868 5 5 0.9202 0.473 
10b 129 3 3 3 0.75 0.408 
11 126 3.167 3 4 1.178 0.242 
11a 127 4.7165 5 5 0.6286 0.14 
11b 127 3.4488 3 3 0.6867 0.104 
12 126 2.754 3 2 1.288 0.231 
12a 126 4.4841 5 5 0.9528 0.026 
12b 127 3.2047 3 3 0.6707 1 
13 127 3.3386 4 4 1.1071 0.4 
13a 129 3.9922 4 5 1.0193 0.003 
13b 129 3.2016 3 3 0.7539 0.079 
14 127 3.5512 4 4 1.0962 0.482 
14a 128 4.0469 4 5 1.093 0.12 
14b 128 3.4766 4 4 0.763 0.313 
15 127 3.504 4 4 1.154 0.162 
15a 125 4.256 5 5 0.9747 0.672 
15b 127 3.4567 3 4 0.71 0.224 
16 126 3.524 4 4 1.15 0.753 
16a 127 4.4173 5 5 0.8493 0.14 
16b 127 3.378 3 3 0.7119 0.055 
Question Response       Standard P 
Number out of 129 Mean Median Mode Deviation Value 
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17 127 3.134 3 4 1.164 0.489 
17a 127 4.3228 5 5 1.0303 0.003 
17b 127 3.1654 3 3 0.6757 0.321 
        
18a 129 3.3643 4 4 1.1315 0.995 
18b 129 3.2946 3 4 1.0854 0.816 
18c 129 3.6047 4 4 1.0564 0.22 
18d 129 2.5659 3 2 1.0595 0.691 
18e 129 2.4651 2 2 1.0387 0.763 
18f 129 3.535 4 4 1.139 0.752 
18g 128 3.117 3 4 1.195 0.055 
18h 129 2.969 3 2 1.218 0.014 
18i 129 2.953 3 4 1.198 0.022 
18j 129 3.5039 4 4 1.0087 0.627 
18k 128 2.5859 3 3 1.1261 0.404 
22 126 2.8095 3 3 0.8071 0.25 
Question Response    Standard P 
Number out of 57 Mean Median Mode Deviation Value 
23a 55 2.964 3 4 1.071 0.732 
23b 55 2.945 3 3 1.026 0.778 
23c 55 3.527 4 4 1.136 0.462 
23d 55 2.309 2 2 0.92 0.732 
23e 55 2.091 2 2 0.888 0.473 
23f 53 3.113 3 4 0.934 0.751 
23g 55 2.618 3 2 1.009 0.079 
23h 55 2.345 2 2 1.004 0.336 
23i 53 2.453 2 2 1.011 0.601 
23j 55 3.018 3 3 0.991 0.452 
23k 55 2.182 2 2 0.884 0.886 
24a 55 4.4 5 5 0.83 0.249 
24b 55 4.036 4 4 0.942 0.111 
24c 55 4.273 4 4 0.781 0.514 
24d 54 3.87 4 4 0.891 0.644 
24e 55 3.182 3 3 1.02 0.672 
24f 54 2.907 3 3 1.033 0.836 
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24g 55 3.364 3 4 1.025 0.568 
24h 53 2.943 3 4 1.008 0.773 
24i 55 3 3 3 0.981 0.776 
24j 54 2.611 3 3 0.998 0.65 
24k 55 3.273 4 4 0.99 0.607 
24l 54 3.611 4 4 0.92 0.671 
24m 54 3.796 4 4 0.898 0.367 
24n 55 3.473 4 4 1.034 0.783 
24o 55 2.945 3 3 1.044 0.781 
 
Table 1.   Measures of Central Tendency and t-Test Results 
for the Naval Special Warfare Officer Survey 
 
Question 22 asked: if a formal block of instruction 
were to be added to a SEAL officer’s career, about how long 
should it be?  Answers ranged from “not required” to “five 
to six months.”  The vast majority of respondents indicated 
that a one- to two-month course would be sufficient.   
Questions 4(a and b) and 13(a and b) had p-value < 
0.10.  This indicates that in all four subjects (4a, 4b, 
13a, and 13b) rank was significantly related to the 
responses.  Question 4 asked about preparedness of officers 
regarding mission planning at the platoon level.  Question 
13 asked about preparedness for fire support coordination 
and execution.  Given the nature of these subjects, it 
quickly becomes evident that senior officers feel more 
prepared in areas that are usually experienced during mid-
level career positions.  In the case of Question 4a and 4b, 
what is interesting is the fact that more senior officers 
thought that they learned mission planning on-the-job vice 
in a formal setting.  The median for Question 4a was 4, 
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while the median for 4b was 3.  The one-way ANOVA analysis, 
however, of 4b indicates that more senior officers believe 
that on-the-job is, in fact, an adequate way to learn that 
skill set.  The one-way ANOVA analysis speaks for itself:  
 Table 2.   SEAL Officer Survey One-way Variance for Question 
4A 
 Table 3.   SEAL Officer Survey One-way Variance for Question 
4B 
Analysis of Variance for 4a       
Source     DF        SS        MS        F        P 
Rank        4     6.835     1.709     2.33    0.059 
Error     123    90.040     0.732 
Total     127    96.875 
                                   Individual 95% CIs For Mean 
                                   Based on Pooled StDev 
Level       N      Mean     StDev  ---------+---------+---------+------- 
1           4    4.0000    1.4142    (----------------*----------------)  
2          10    3.6000    1.0750  (----------*----------)  
3          57    3.7193    0.9956           (---*----)  
4          38    3.8158    0.5626            (----*-----)  
5          19    4.3684    0.5973                     (------*-------)  
                                   ---------+---------+---------+------- 
Pooled StDev =   0.8556                   3.50      4.00      4.50 
Analysis of Variance for 4b       
Source     DF        SS        MS        F        P 
Rank        4     5.684     1.421     2.55    0.043 
Error     123    68.535     0.557 
Total     127    74.219 
                                   Individual 95% CIs For Mean 
                                   Based on Pooled StDev 
Level       N      Mean     StDev  -------+---------+---------+--------- 
1           4    4.0000    0.0000             (------------*-----------)  
2          10    3.5000    0.5270          (------*-------)  
3          57    3.0702    0.8207       (--*--)  
4          38    3.2632    0.6851         (---*---)  
5          19    2.9474    0.7799  (-----*-----)  
                                   -------+---------+---------+--------- 
Pooled StDev =   0.7465                 3.00      3.60      4.20 
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Question 13(a and b) has similar results to Question 
4(a and b).  Although the median indicates that more formal 
training is desired, more senior officers felt that on-the-
job training was nearly as important.  This result could be 
probably tied to senior officers having more experience in 
mission planning and fire support coordination and 
execution.  Having learned this way, senior officers most 
likely believe that is an adequate way to master that skill-
set. 
Question 6 asked about an officer’s preparedness 
regarding tactical employment of Naval Special Warfare Task 
Unit (NSWTU) Assets.  In this subject, rank clearly was a 
factor: 
 Table 4.   SEAL Officer Survey One-way Variance for Question 
6  
 
Lieutenant Commanders and Commanders responded that 
they were prepared to utilize organic Naval Special Warfare 
assets.  The larger number of Lieutenants (O-3’s), however, 
Analysis of Variance for 6        
Source     DF        SS        MS        F        P 
Rank        4     8.232     2.058     2.18    0.076 
Error     118   111.638     0.946 
Total     122   119.870 
                                   Individual 95% CIs For Mean 
                                   Based on Pooled StDev 
Level       N      Mean     StDev  ----+---------+---------+---------+-- 
1           4    3.7500    0.9574  (----------------*---------------)  
2          10    3.7000    0.6749        (---------*---------)  
3          53    3.4151    1.0272         (---*---)  
4          37    3.9730    1.0668                 (----*----)  
5          19    3.9474    0.7050              (-------*------)  
                                   ----+---------+---------+---------+-- 
Pooled StDev =   0.9727              3.00      3.60      4.20      4.80 
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did not feel as strong about their preparedness.  This is an 
interesting indicator since O-3’s hold assignments as 
platoon commanders.  The SEAL officer survey did not 
distinguish between officers who have completed their 
platoon commander tour to those who have not.  Question 6a, 
asking how training for NSWTU assets was received (either 
on-the-job or formal), also resulted in a p-value < 0.10.  
Thus, the more senior the officer, the stronger the feeling 
that training had been on-the-job.  
 
Table 5.   SEAL Officer Survey One-way Variance for Question 
6A 
 
Questions 18g, (h), and (i) all had p-value < 0.10.  
Question 18g dealt with joint doctrine.  And 18h covered 
preparedness in national security affairs and the national 
security decision process.  Finally, 18i covered theater 
planning. In each case, the more senior the officer, the 
more prepared he felt.  This is a direct result of varied 
experience, exposure to commands and staff, and longer time 
in the service.  The median for all three subjects, however, 
remained at 3—indicating much room for improvement.     
Analysis of Variance for 6a       
Source     DF        SS        MS        F        P 
Rank        4     7.865     1.966     2.22    0.071 
Error     119   105.385     0.886 
Total     123   113.250 
                                   Individual 95% CIs For Mean 
                                   Based on Pooled StDev 
Level       N      Mean     StDev  ----+---------+---------+---------+-- 
1           4    3.5000    1.9149   (------------*------------)  
2          10    3.8000    1.1353            (-------*--------)  
3          53    4.2453    0.9589                       (---*--)  
4          38    4.2368    0.8833                      (----*---)  
5          19    4.6842    0.5824                           (-----*-----) 
                                   ----+---------+---------+---------+-- 
Pooled StDev =   0.9411              2.80      3.50      4.20      4.90 
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2. Median and Mode Analysis 
Given the five-point response scale, any response with 
a median ≤ 2 was considered an area requiring immediate 
attention.  A majority of these items came in the evaluation 
of junior officers by senior officers.  Survey Question 23, 
with sub-questions (a) through (k) asked officers (O-4 and 
O-5) the following:  “The officers under my command 
(platoon/task unit/squadron) are (were) prepared to go to 
war in the following areas.”  Those subjects (a) through (k) 
were the same educational domain as Question 18.  Those 
responses with a median or 2 or less are as follows: 
• 23d, information and net warfare.  Median = 2. 
• 23e, psychological warfare.  Median = 2. 
• 23h, national security affairs and national 
security decision process.  Median = 2. 
• 23i, theater planning.  Median = 2 
• 23k, civil affairs.  Median = 2. 
Question 18e (psychological operations), posed to all 
ranks, also resulted in a median value of 2.  As with the 
subjects with low p values, this median analysis provides 
another way to consider which subject matters have room for 
improvement in the Naval Special Warfare officer community.  
Attention, however, must also be considered for medians of 
3.  Since the response “neither agree or disagree” could 
have different meanings to different people, the author 
decided to focus solely on responses with a median of 2 or 
less.  Future goals could focus on raising all responses to 
a median or 4 or higher.  Only through proper SEAL 
education, training, and preparedness can this happen. In 
addition, it is crucial that areas in which officers felt 
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prepared must not be curtailed to address shortfalls.  Those 
subjects that reported proper training and education must be 
maintained. 
In addition to the median analysis, the mode was also a 
significant factor in analysis.  The mode, the most frequent 
response, would not be pulled up or down by a larger number 
of extreme end-responses.  The mode is important, however, 
because it demonstrates trends not seen in the median.  Five 
subject matters had a mode ≤ 2: 
• 7, adjacent unit coordination and deconfliction.  
Mode = 2. 
• 12, other government agency integration.  Mode = 
2. 
• 18d, information and net warfare.  Mode = 2. 
• 18h, national security affairs and national 
security decision process.  Mode = 2. 
• 23g, joint doctrine.  Mode = 2. 
Not surprisingly, these subjects remain a common theme 
in both the SEAL officer survey and the JSOU (2005) report 
regarding SOF officer education.  This fact indicates that 
SOF operators surveyed in 2005 mirror the sentiments of SEAL 
officers surveyed in 2007.  Therefore, many of the areas 
that required attention in 2005 still exist today in the 
Naval Special Warfare Community. 
3. On-the-job versus Formal Median Analysis 
The tactical domain with amplifying information 
(questions with “a” and “b” follow-on questions) asked (a) 
how training was received, as well as (b) how the respondent 
thinks training should be received.  Answers that had a ∆ 
between the medians indicated areas in which the SEAL 
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officer corps believed training and education should involve 
more or less formal instruction.  In this case, all subjects 
with ∆’s (regarding formal versus on-the-job training) 
indicated a desire for additional formal instruction vice 
additional on-the-job instruction.  In the fifteen questions 
between and including 3a/3b and 17a/17b,  nine of the 
response pairs indicated that the subject in question was 
learned 100% on-the-job (a median of 5) though the 
respondent felt that the subject should be learned with 50% 
on-the-job experience and 50% formal instruction (a median 
of 3).  These nine subjects had a median difference of 2, 
from 5 to 3. Although three additional subjects (4, 9, and 
13) had (a) medians of 4 with (b) medians of 3, this 
analysis focuses on the nine subjects with the greatest 
differences.  Subjects with a 5 to 3 median drop included:   
• 6, tactical employment of organic NSWTU assets.   
• 7, adjacent unit coordination and deconfliction.   
• 8, liaison skills to conventional and SOF staffs.   
• 10, technical knowledge of joint supporting 
assets.   
• 11, combat advising and foreign internal defense.   
• 12, other government agency integration.   
• 15, sniper and counter-sniper employment. 
• 16, ground force commander roles and 
responsibilities. 
• 17, integration of special activities. 
These nine subjects indicate room for improvement 




4. Correlation Analysis 
Correlation is the measure of the linear relationship 
among the variables.  If the correlation was greater than 
0.70 then it was considered a strong linear relationship.  
If the correlation was between 0.50 and 0.70 then the 
relationship was moderate.  Correlations less than 0.50 were 
weak relationships. When analyzed using a correlation matrix 
with MINITAB (1998), certain subject areas showed linkages 
that reflected relationships between areas of interest.  
More specifically, subjects in the “tactical” domain showed 
moderate correlations within themselves.  Similarly, 
subjects in the “educational” domain also showed 
correlations among other “educational” subjects.  No 
statistically significant correlations, however, were noted 
between “tactical” and “educational” domains.   
The following table of correlations was noted within 
the “tactical” domain: 
 
Table 6.   Correlation Matrix for Questions 6 through 8 
 
Questions 6 through 8 tend to be associated with mid-
grade officers in tactical situations.  Question 6, tactical 
employment of NSWTU assets, and Question 7, adjacent unit 
coordination and deconfliction are naturally linked by the 
Correlation: Questions 6-8 
Question    6      7 
 
7         .573  
 
8         .466   .768 
Correlations:  Questions 6-8 & 16-17 
Question    6     7     8 
 
16        .508  .469  .459   
 
17        .491  .538 
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nature of the subjects.  In order to properly employ assets, 
an officer must deconflict those assets throughout the 
battle-space.  One of the highest correlations (.768) was 
observed between Question 7 and Question 8, liaison skills 
to conventional and SOF staffs.  There is an obvious 
relationship between coordination and deconfliction and 
liaison positions.  Many SEAL officers have filled liaison 
positions in some fashion, and the liaison job description 
often involves coordinating and deconflicting SEAL 




Table 7.   Correlation Matrix for Questions 7 through 16 
 
Questions 7 through 12 represent subjects that deal 
with people or things outside of the organic Naval Special 
Warfare community, and, therefore, that show correlations.  
The following is a list of those subjects: 
• 7, adjacent unit coordination and deconfliction. 
• 8, LNO skills to conventional and SOF staffs. 
• 9, briefing, communication, and public speaking. 
• 10, technical knowledge of joint supporting 
assets. 
Correlations:  Questions 7-12 
Question    7     8     9     10     11 
 
8         .768   
 
9         .530  .539 
 
10        .552  .639  .446 
 
11        .478  .562  .482  .493 
 
12        .659  .626  .478  .655  .486 
Correlations:  Questions 13-16 
Question    13     14     15 
 
14        .617   
 
15        .555    .488 
 






• 11, combat advising and foreign internal defense. 
• 12, other government agency integration. 
It appears that anytime an outside entity is involved, 
those subjects tend to cluster together.  This information 
would be useful in setting up blocks of instruction to 
demonstrate to linkages between these subjects. 
 
                  
Table 8.   Correlation Matrix for Questions 18a through 18c 
 
Table 8 presents correlations noted within the 
“educational” domain.  Questions 18a through 18c show the 
strongest correlation (.796) for good reason.  There is 
overlapping subject matter in all three areas.  18a, 
guerilla warfare, often associated with 18b, insurgency and 
counter insurgency.  These subjects often are taught in 
tandem.  Additionally, 18c, terrorism and counter terrorism 
also is connected to guerilla warfare and insurgencies.  
Many argue that terrorism is simply a tactic involved in 
guerilla warfare and insurgencies.  Regardless, there is an 
obvious relationship.   
 
Correlations:  Questions 18a-c 
Question    18a   18b 
 
18b        .796   
 
18c        .566         .634 
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Table 9.   Correlation Matrix for Questions 18f through 18k 
 
The correlations of 18f through 18i, presented in Table 
9, represent operational and strategic mission planning 
normally associated with mid- to senior-grade officers.  It 
is no wonder that these subjects showed some of the 
strongest relationships.  The following is a list of 18f 
through 18i: 
• 18f, military decision-making process. 
• 18g, joint doctrine. 
• 18h, national security affairs, national security 
decision process. 
• 18i, theater planning. 
Questions 18i through 18k describe subjects a SEAL 
officer may or may not be exposed to due to rank or specific 
experiences, and therefore may share a moderate correlation. 
Question 18j, SOF history and 18k, civil affairs, are 
subjects not normally taught in existing SEAL educational 
structures.  Basic SEAL history is learned both at BUD/s and 
JOTC, but the instruction suggested by the researcher would 
be more SOF-focused than SEAL-focused. 
If the Naval Special Warfare community plans to address 
educational shortfalls addressed in this thesis, these 
correlations represent areas that could be grouped together 
for maximum attention.  Since much of the subject matter is 
Correlations:  Questions 18f-i 
Question    18f   18g   18h   
 
18g        .681   
 
18h        .558  .722 
 
18i        .528  .703   .765 
Correlations:  Questions 18i-k 
Question    18i    
 
18j        .504   
 




inherently related, it makes sense to teach them together 
during any and all forms of formal education.  
5. Selected Quotes 
The third domain within the survey was in short-answer 
format.  A total of 15 pages of 8-point font, single spaced 
answers were collected and combined.  Question number 19 
asked, “If you could add additional block(s) of instruction, 
training or education, to a J.O.’s career path to better 
prepare him for combat, what would it/they be?”  Some 
selected responses included: 
• Mandatory formal training in Joint Doctrine 
(terms, organizations, sister-service 
capabilities, sister-service doctrine and TTPs) 
and MDMP. 
• Briefing and communicating classes/Introduction 
into the interagency processes/Big 
Army/Navy/Marine tactics—joint tactics/Counter 
Insurgency tactics—big-picture process & goals. 
• Send all JOs—after AOIC tour and before OIC tour—
through the Army Maneuver Course or a like USMC 
infantry/officer advance course.  Learn a 
different lexicon, develop maneuver distinctions, 
[and] develop lifelong/professional relationships 
outside of NSW. 
Question 20 asked, “If you could add additional 
block(s) of instruction, training or education, to a J.O.’s 
career path to better prepare him for staff, LNO and 
eventual command position, what would it/they be?”  Some 
selected responses included: 
• Participation in conventional unit's CERTEX or 
similar exercises in a LNO/staff job.  Even just 
observing how these units view different 
battlefield situations and SOF units will help 
when the JO is faced with working with or for 
these units. 
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• Be an action officer at an overseas unit between 
his AOIC and OIC [to gain] exposure to the staffs, 
LNO, and Joint work.  In addition, you understand 
the role of the theaters and the mission. 
• OJT: mandatory 90-day rotations to combat areas, 
NSWTUs, JSOTFs and JTFs. 
• Immediate deployment to a combat zone!  After SQT, 
all JOs should deploy to a SOTF in order to get 
hands-on training in a TOC.  The skills and 
knowledge learned in such an environment is 
invaluable to a young officer's career. 
Question 21 asked, “What would you suggest as “other” 
ways to educate junior officers in NAVSPECWAR community?” 
Answers included the following: 
• Introduce formalized continuing education for 
officers as they go up the chain of command and 
better prepare them for different responsibilities 
especially in the joint environment. 
• SEAL officer education and professional 
development should be continuous and constantly 
evolving.  The SEAL community can take better 
advantage of JSOU and send officers to Florida or 
invite their MTTs to the Groups and Units for 
courses when SEALs have down time.   
• The other services, though having large SOF 
communities, make education a priority and that is 
why Army, Air Force and USMC officers are better 
prepared for staff duty; the importance of which 
many NSW officers do not recognize because they 
are trying to avoid the staffs to stay in the 
fight to get screened.  Many do not recognize the 
importance of the staffs in getting the equipment 
needed to do the job and fighting for the 
approvals to utilize the authorities we have been 
given. 
(Note: A copy of the consolidated written responses can be 
obtained by contacting the author.) 
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6. Consolidated Written Response Information 
As a whole, the written responses provided enormous 
amounts of feedback.  Consolidated subjects from all three 
written responses maintained similar themes.  From question 
19 (asking for suggestions to better prepare a junior 
officer for combat), the most frequent response came in the 
form of a Platoon Commander or Task Unit Commander course of 
instruction, similar to the previously mentioned SEAL 
Lieutenants Career Course.  Many suggestions recommended 
modeling the course after the Army’s Career Captains Course 
or the USMC Expeditionary Warfare Course.  Other topics 
mentioned with high frequency included integration with 
conventional forces, joint doctrine, language and culture, 
liaison tours with units with high operational tempos, and 
attending preexisting courses at other service institutions.  
Question number 21, asking for additional suggestions to 
better prepare officers, garnered similar answers.  A formal 
block of O-3 instruction topped the list, followed by 
temporary duty to deployed staffs and units, battle-staff 
training, mandatory diversity tours, JPME-1, and 
conventional and interagency training.  A few responses 
indicated that nothing new is required or should be added to 
a junior officer’s career.  Some responses indicated that 
junior officers need more on-the-job training.  But as a 
whole, however, most of the responses indicated that some 
form of additional instruction is needed to better prepare a 




E. DATA REVIEW 
Considering the nature of the written responses and the 
analysis of the survey data, it appears that there is both a 
desire and a need for more formal structure in the Naval 
Special Warfare junior officer career.  A SEAL Lieutenants 
Career Course is needed to address shortfalls in education 
and to instruct officers in the complexity of the modern 
military environment.  The following table is a combined 
list of nineteen subjects indicated by the SEAL officer 
survey that could be improved though more formal education: 
 
– Mission planning at the 
platoon level  
– Tactical employment of 
organic NSWTU assets  
– Adjacent unit coordination 
and deconfliction 
– LNO skills to conventional 
and SOF staffs 
– Briefing, communication and 
public speaking  
– Technical knowledge of joint 
supporting assets 
– Combat advising and foreign 
internal defense  
– Fire support coordination and 
execution 
– Sniper and counter-sniper 
employment 
– Ground force commander roles 
and responsibilities 
– Integration of special 
activities 
– Psychological warfare 
– Information and net warfare 
– Joint doctrine 
– National security affairs and 
national security decision 
process 
– Theater planning 
– Language and culture 
– Insurgency and counter-
insurgency operations  
- Other government agency 
integration 
Figure 4.   Consolidated List of Naval Special Warfare 
Officer Survey Results Indicating Areas of Improvement 
 
 
In additional to formal blocks of instruction, the 
written responses indicated that overseas staff deployment 
and augmentation is also a way for junior officers to gain 
professional experience and help put education into 
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operational perspective.  A combined and structured approach 
to education and professional development would greatly 




III. OTHER SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES OFFICER 
EDUCATION BACKGROUND 
A. MILITARY DIRECTIVES ON EDUCATION 
1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 
1800.01C (2005), entitled Officer Professional Military 
Education Policy (OPMEP), describes the intentions and 
requirements for the education of U.S. military officers.  
Paragraph 4a, the Chairman’s Vision, clearly states, “PME-
both service and Joint—is the critical element in officer 
development and is the foundation of a joint learning 
continuum that ensures our Armed Forces are intrinsically 
learning organizations” (2005, p. 1).  Specifically, 
enclosure A of the instruction states:  
Professional development is the product of a 
learning continuum that comprises training, 
experience, education, and self-improvement.  PME 
provides the education needed to complement 
training, experience, and self-improvement to 
produce the most professionally competent 
individual process. (2005, p. A-1) 
The SEAL officer PME survey conducted in this study 
highlights the fact the Naval Special Warfare Officers 
receive a significant amount of on-the-job training and 
experience, while specific and structured education 
experiences throughout a SEAL junior officer’s career are 
few and far between.  Through the rank of Lieutenant 
Commander (O-4), required education in the SEAL community 
consists of JOTC and JPME-1.  As stated, field experience 
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and realistic training events are essential to the 
development of a SEAL junior officer.  The CJCSC Instruction 
1800.01C (2005), however, dictates that formal education is 
a critical and required component for a well-rounded and 
effective officer. 
CJCSI 1800.01C (2005), Appendix A to Enclosure A, 
breaks down professional military education into five 
categories: First, precommissioning education received at 
institutions prior to becoming an officer; second, primary 
education that includes branch qualification and is 
generally received within O-1 through the O-3 ranks; third, 
intermediate education, usually received at the O-4 level; 
fourth, senior-level education for the O-5 and O-6 ranks; 
finally, the fifth category is designed for General and Flag 
officers for ranks O-7 and above (2005, p. A-A-2).  Initial 
service-branch qualifying schooling is conducted at the 
primary level.  For Naval Special Warfare, Basic Underwater 
Demolition/SEAL (BUD/s) School and the Junior Officer 
Training Course (JOTC) would be considered a branch 
qualifier and primary PME.  In the primary phase of officer 
education, however, CJCSI 1800.01C also emphasizes the 
education required for an O-3: “Service schools that have 
programs centered on pay grade O-3 officers will foster an 
understanding of joint warfighting necessary for success at 
this level” (2005, p. A-A-3).  Naval Special Warfare, 
however, does not have a service school or institution for 
the O-3 level outside of the Naval Postgraduate School.  
Therefore, as stated previously, all of Naval Special 
Warfare’s primary education is currently received at JOTC, 
prior to a SEAL officer’s first operational assignment. 
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B. OTHER SERVICE SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES EDUCATION 
1. U.S. Army Special Forces 
A United States Army Special Forces Officer cannot join 
the Special Operations community until he has first 
completed at least one tour in the conventional U.S. Army 
forces.  According to a Special Forces recruitment 
publication entitled Thinking About Special Forces?  Answers 
to Often-asked Questions, an Army officer wishing to apply 
for Special Forces could look to do so as early as his third 
year in service (2007, p. 9).  He would, however, already 
have attended his basic branch officer training and the 
Captains Career Course as part of his professional military 
education prior to attending the Special Forces 
Qualification Course.  These blocks would precede his 
selection into Special Forces, which would then be followed 
by 48 weeks of Special Forces training.  The Special Forces 
Qualification Officer Course, called the 18A, is described 
in a Special Forces Qualification Course Fact Sheet (U.S. 
Army, 2006, March) as follows: 
Company A, 4th Bn. trains and qualifies officers 
in the basic skills and knowledge required to 
perform duties as an ODA commander with an 
emphasis on adaptive thinking and leadership 
which fosters critical thinking and creative 
solutions.  This training also includes Special 
Forces planning and working in joint and 
interagency operations, engineer and weapons 
training, communications and medical training, 
special reconnaissance, direct action, 
unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, 
and counterinsurgency operations. (2006, March, 
p. 3)   
 54
This preparation, consisting of an Army officer’s 
branch qualifying school, the Captains Career Course, 
Special Forces selection, and the Special Forces 
Qualification course, would make him qualified to take 
command of an operational Special Forces team.  This 
Operational Detachment Alfa (ODA) team is commanded by an 
Army Captain (O-3), and is equivalent to a U.S. Navy SEAL 
Platoon Commander in relative rank, responsibility, and time 
in service as a commissioned officer. 
Regardless of the content in the Special Forces officer 
selection and qualification course, a major contrast of Army 
Special Forces officers to Naval Special Warfare officers is 
that all of the Army SFOs have already completed a course 
specifically designed for Captains (O-3).  According to 
Trice (2007) in an Army Times article, “[t]he Captains 
Career Course, previously call the Advanced Career Course, 
is about 20 weeks for active officers” (2007, p. 15).  
Though not designed for Special Forces officers, the 
Captains Career Course remains a single point of instruction 
for all Army officers—reaffirming basic military 
information, reiterating professional military knowledge, 
and focusing on rank-equivalent leadership and preparation 
for higher command and staff. “The course focuses on the 
skills and knowledge needed by captains to command company-
size units and to serve on battalion and brigade staffs” 
(Trice, 2007, p. 15).  Since the Army has been in steady 
combat since 2002—with the invasion of Afghanistan, then 
followed by the 2003 invasion of Iraq—“[t]he curriculum […] 
continuously updates with lessons learned from Iraq and 
Afghanistan” (2007, p. 15). The Captains Career Course, 
though not the sole source of education for a Special Forces 
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officer, remains a source of common ground within the Army.  
Senior commanders can hold certain expectations when they 
know that all of their junior officers have received a 
specific level of instruction.  “The CCC common core, called 
C5, becomes a requirement for active and reserve officers 
beginning June 1 [2007]” (2007, p. 15).  The U.S. Army seems 
to understand the importance of primary education (as 
directed by the CJCSC instruction (2005)) during the latter 
years of a junior officer’s career.  
In addition to examining the required education of a 
Special Forces officer, another aspect necessary for this 
analysis is to consider some of the other beneficial, but 
not required, professional development schools the Army 
offers.  Though focused on field leadership opportunities, 
courses like Ranger School and Path Finder School offer 
significant field craft, simulated combat leadership stress, 
and (when attended by members of other services) a unique 
insight into the U.S. Army.  Additionally, by participating 
in such courses, officers make personal relationships with 
service counterparts that will last throughout their careers 
and often beyond.  Even the Army’s Infantry Officer Basic 
Course (IOBC) could be considered an educational option for 
SEAL junior officers to help them reexamine small-unit 
infantry tactics and fire and maneuver strategies. 
C. JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY 
As mentioned in Chapter II above, the Joint Special 
Operations University 2005 analysis of education in the SOF 
community indicated many of the same problem areas noted in 
the SEAL junior officer survey conducted in this research.  
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The JSOU report (Booz Allen Hamilton, 2005) indicated 
numerous areas that required attention: 
In addition, through the survey and focus 
groups/interviews, study participants suggested 
numerous operational and strategic topics that 
were either not already covered in the PME system 
or, in their opinion, not covered well.  The list 
of topics is quite large; however, several topics 
were mentioned repeatedly (see list below) and 
should be given priority consideration by JSOU 
for thematic content in future course 
development.  They are consistent with the 
competency model’s illustrative behaviors. (2005, 
p. 40) 
The list includes: 
– Introduction to other 
government agencies  
• Culture 
• Coordination with SOF 
• Resourcing and sustainment 
• Operations 
– Logistics support to Special 
Operations  
– SOF integration with 
conventional forces 
– Practical JSOTF exercises 
– Battle staff operations in a 
joint/combined/interagency 
environment 
– Joint Force mission planning 
– SOF campaign planning and 
integration with conventional 
force operations 
– Art and science of vision and 
strategy 
– Theory and art of 
unconventional warfare 
– National security and defense 
policy 
– National military strategy 
– Theater strategy and 
operational campaign planning 
– Joint conventional and joint 
SOF planning processes and 
systems 
– Terrorism 
– Global insurgency/global 
irregular warfare 
– Network operations 
– SOF effects-based operations 
– Joint, interagency, 
multinational capabilities and 
integration 
– Dealing with the 
press/information 
operations/strategic influence 
– Alternative futures 
– Operations in ambiguous 
environments 
Figure 5.   List of Topics that Required Attention—
Suggested by JSOU Survey 
(From Booz Allen Hamilton, 2005, p. 41) 
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The comments in the SEAL junior officer survey written 
responses mirror the JSOU findings.  The SEAL survey 
suggests areas of improvement include battle-staff training, 
inter-agency courses of instruction, coordination with 
conventional forces, technical and tactical knowledge of 
joint supporting assets, joint doctrine, and unconventional 
warfare, just to name a few.   
Considering the “Late to Need” diagram, one of JSOU’s 
responses to the Booz Allen 2005 study was to create the 
Joint Special Operations Warfighter Certificate. 
Specifically, as indicated in Lt. Col. John Prairie’s (2007, 
April) Tip of the SPEAR article: 
The Certificate is for SOF personnel in their 
mid-career.  It is designed for those personnel 
preparing for, enroute to, or assigned to their 
first joint SOF headquarters at a theater SOC, 
the USSOCOM CSO or a component or joint force 
headquarters.  The intended audience is Special 
Operations Senior Noncommissioned Officers (E-6 
through E-9), Warrant (WO-1-4) and Commissioned 
Officers (O-2 through O-4). (2007, p. 47) 
This program was designed to give tactical leaders 
desired education prior to command and leadership at junior 
officer ranks and on joint staffs.  Special Operations 
officers have enormous responsibilities very early in their 
careers; however, as demonstrated by the “Late to Need” 
diagram, that education often comes after critical and often 
dynamic field experiences.  In essence, the education comes 
too late.  The JSOU warfighter certificate is earned after 
completing three, non-sequential, two-week modules—for a 
total of six weeks of instruction.  Prairie (2007) describes 
the content of the three modules.  Module one is Joint SOF 
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Application and Strategy.  Module Two is the Theory of 
Irregular Warfare.  Finally, Module Three is the Joint 
Special Operations Collaborative Planning Course. The 
courses are designed to be reactive to student feedback, as 
the global Special Operations environment is constantly 
changing.  This program is an excellent step in solving the 
education problem in the SOF community.  Without question, 
SEAL junior officers would benefit from this program offered 
by the Joint Special Operations University. 
A recent JSOU publication by Harry R. Yarger (2007) 
focuses specifically on Special Operations Forces Education.  
Similar to the goals of the JSOU Warfighter Certificate, 
Yarger’s text emphasizes the importance of education at all 
levels in order for personnel to understand environments and 
how they are linked.  His “Realms of Strategy” diagram 













Strategic thinking occurs in all realms and there is a
relationship among the realms and among the environments
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Military Strategy  
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Figure 6.   Yarger’s Realms of Strategy 
(From Yarger 2007, p. 16) 
 59
Many military officers try to categorize environments 
into isolated zones that they assume have little overlap 
with other environments.  Junior leaders tend to focus, and 
are often instructed to focus, on tactical-level issues.  
Yarger (2007) argues that the tactical environment is simply 
one single environment connected to all aspects of modern 
warfare.  A junior officer need not be a master in every 
environment, but he or she must understand the consequences 
of his or her actions across the military, civilian, and 
political spectrum.  The JSOU Warfighter Certificate is 
designed to facilitate just that.  Since formal service 
education often comes after a Special Operations officer has 
spent time commanding in the field, the Warfighter 
Certificate provides key insights at a junior-enough level 
that an officer understands the “Realms of Strategy” before 
field command. 
D.  THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL, MONTEREY 
Another opportunity for special operations forces to 
receive SOF specific education comes from the Defense 
Analysis Department at the Naval Postgraduate School in 
Monterey, California.  The department’s webpage (2007) 
clearly describes the SOCOM sponsored special operations and 
irregular warfare curriculum:  
The Special Operations/Irregular Warfare 
curriculum is designed to provide a focused 
course of study of the conflict spectrum below 
general conventional war. Graduates of this 
curriculum will possess a thorough knowledge of 
the broad range of factors involved in the 
planning and conduct of these forms of conflict 
and a detailed understanding of the role of 
special operations and related forces in U.S. 
foreign and defense policy. The curriculum 
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examines the sources and dynamics of inter-state 
and intra-state conflict; the challenge these 
forms of conflict have posed and are likely to 
increasingly pose for U.S. security planning; the 
doctrinal and institutional evolution of the U.S. 
special operations community; the recent history 
of political violence and "small wars"; the 
history of irregular warfare; and contemporary 
perspectives on low-intensity conflict 
resolution. The curriculum provides the graduate 
with a strong background in the areas of 
strategic analysis, decision making, organization 
theory, the technological revolution in military 
affairs, and advanced analytical methods. (2007) 
This eighteen-month program at the Naval Postgraduate 
School is ideally constructed to address SOF-specific 
education for modern-day conflicts.  Consideration should be 
given to maximizing current SEAL participation in the 
Defense Analysis curriculum, as well as to expanding 
enrollment opportunities beyond what is currently available 
within Naval Special Warfare.  An argument could easily be 
made that nowhere else in the military education system can 
officers receive such in-depth and SOF-specific focus.   
E. PRECOMMISSIONING EDUCATIONAL EMPHASIS AT SERVICE 
ACADEMIES 
1. United States Naval Academy 
There is some debate as to the nature of 
precommissioning education at the service academies and its 
relevance to the current war in which the United States is 
involved.  Specifically, the service academies provide the 
single greatest concentrations of future officers in one of 
three locations: Annapolis, West Point, and Colorado 
Springs.  Therefore, it should be seemingly easy to develop 
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warrior leaders prepared to engage in modern battle.  The 
question remains, however: which battle?  Andrew Exum’s 2007 
article in the The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
entitled “Are U.S. Military Academies Preparing Graduates 
for Today’s Wars?” addresses this question:  
Today, both the Army and Marine Corps demand 
officers with more language skills, experience 
living abroad in foreign cultures, and knowledge 
of not just modern technology but also the 
regions where they might be called to serve. The 
service academies’ strong emphasis on math and 
science supports a vision of war still 
fashionable in some circles of the defense 
establishment, in which technology plays a 
leading role. But the wars that the United States 
finds itself fighting today are low-tech affairs. 
(2007) 
In 2008, The United States Naval Academy will 
commission up to twenty-six SEAL candidates.  This number 
could represent almost a third of the total SEAL Ensigns (O-
1) reporting to basic SEAL training for that year.    
Therefore, nearly one-third of the SEAL candidates for 2008 
will have the opportunity for SEAL-specific precommissioning 
education.  Seniors at the United States Naval Academy 
receive their service assignment during the first semester 
of their final year.  Therefore, during their second and 
final semester, seniors each take a naval leadership class 
that corresponds to their specific service assignment.   
The current SEAL candidate curriculum at USNA is 
drafted by the resident SEAL officer (currently an O-3) 
assigned to the Naval Academy and is approved by the Naval 
Academy Professional Development Department.  The current 
curriculum for SEAL candidates is described in the USNA 
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NS425 Academic Year 2008 (Appendix 5) syllabus (2007), is 
drafted by the USNA resident SEAL officer (Lieutenant P. 
Logan) with no input from the greater SEAL community.  
Fortunately, despite the lack of guidance, the course is 
well-designed to give an introduction to Naval Special 
Warfare and the Special Operations Community as a whole.  
The SEAL officer assigned to the Naval Academy relies on 
past experience as he drafts the class content—content that 
must (in the current education continuum) fulfill the 
requirements as laid out in CJCSC 1800.01C (2005) for 
precommissioning education requirements: 
Precommissioning education focuses on preparing 
officer candidates to become commissioned 
officers within the Military Department that 
administers the precommissioning program. The 
curricula are oriented toward providing 
candidates with a basic grounding in the U.S. 
defense establishment and their chosen Military 
Service, as well as a foundation in leadership, 
management, ethics, and other subjects necessary 
to prepare them to serve as commissioned 
officers. (2005, A-A-2) 
Additionally, the CJCSC 1800.01C, Annex A to Appendix A 
to Enclosure A specifically indicates that precommissioning 
education should include National Military Capabilities and 
Organization, as well as a foundation in Joint Warfare.  The 
USNA curriculum, combined with Lieutenants Logan’s NS425 
(2007)—with 20 blocks of instruction and a graded 
examination—fulfills the precommissioning requirement for 
future SEAL officers.  As always, however, there is room for 
improvement in the Naval Academy’s SEAL candidate education 
process in order to maximize time prior to midshipmen 
commencing SEAL training.    
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The SEAL officer assigned to the Naval Academy receives 
very little direct input or guidance from the senior SEAL 
leadership community.  What is being taught is totally up to 
the discretion of the assigned SEAL officer, regardless of 
his experience or background.  In short, there is no 
required consistency between rotating SEAL officers that 
serve at USNA.  Another problem with this curriculum is the 
lack of approved security clearances held by soon-to-be 
graduating midshipman.  If seniors selected as SEAL 
candidates received security clearances prior to attending 
NS425, then the scope of the class could be widened—covering 
a broader range of applicable topics.  Policy makers within 
the SEAL community have an opportunity to commence SEAL-
specific education at the earliest possible time.  Granted, 
additional investigation must be conducted in order to 
extend the same opportunities to SEAL accessions through 
ROTC and Officer Candidate School (OCS).    
Finally, in addition to the formal instruction received 
by potential SEAL candidates, the Naval Academy often hosts 
formal and informal “career night” events, at which current 
SEAL officers have an opportunity to interact with 
midshipmen.  These opportunities are predictable; however, 
they rely solely on invitations to current SEALs from the 
SEAL officer assigned to the Academy.  That officer may or 
may not have access to or knowledge of an officer pool that 
could be better suited to address potential candidates. 
2. United States Military Academy   
Unlike the U.S. Naval Academy, the U.S. Military 
Academy does not graduate officers directly into the Special 
Operations community.  All officers with aspirations for 
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Special Operations must first be assigned and serve time 
with a conventional unit.  After that, an individual may opt 
for numerous branches within the Special Operations 
community.  Exum’s (2007) article does not spare West Point 
in his criticism of the inapplicability of service academy 
education, given the nature of the modern threat:  
But the challenge facing both academies today is 
not so much whether or not to remain engineering 
schools, but how to balance the practical skills 
that officers need on the modern battlefield—
languages and cultural intelligence in addition 
to more traditional martial skills—with the 
academies’ loftier goal of giving their cadets 
and midshipmen a broad “intellectual foundation” 
for service. (2007) 
Interestingly enough, however, unlike the U.S. Naval 
Academy, West Point offers a degree in Military Art and 
Science.  The U.S. Military Academy Class of 2009 Department 
of Military Instruction pamphlet indicates that cadets can 
choose one of two tracks within the Military Art and Science 
Major: Operations or Irregular Warfare.  In the Operations 
track, cadets can take courses such as Military 
Communication or Combat Leadership.  In the Irregular 
Warfare track, courses such as Special Operations/Low-
intensity Conflict and The History of Unconventional Warfare 
are offered.  Regardless of the selected tract, electives in 
the Military Art and Science Major include courses such as 
Counterinsurgency Operations, Korea-Vietnam Military 





3. Service Academy Summary 
Since the U.S. Naval Academy graduates future SEALs and 
U.S. Marines alike, a major similar to the one offered at 
the U.S. Military Academy would certainly be beneficial to a 
junior officer preparing for an overseas combat assignment.  
The fact remains that graduates of the U.S. Naval Academy 
who are designated as SEAL candidates are immediately 
members of the Special Operations community.  Their 
education, both prior to graduation and throughout their 
careers, is crucial to their competent and judicious 
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IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
1. Need for Structured Education within Naval 
Special Warfare 
Naval Special Warfare must formally educate SEAL junior 
officers to prepare them for the complex environment they 
will face.  This research has shown specific educational 
shortfalls that require attention.  Though SEALs continue to 
demonstrate excellent and heroic performance in command, 
staff, and battle, one facet of their professional 
development is missing—a crucial element that could better 
prepare an officer for a career in Naval Special Warfare.  
This facet is education.  This thesis does not intend for 
Naval Special Warfare to simply increase an emphasis on 
education, but rather to set the standard for SOF officer 
education.  No other SOF community takes in a vast majority 
of its officers at the O-1 level.  Therefore, SEALs spend 
their entire career in special operations—affording more 
time for education.  Yet, though other service SOFs can 
expect a block of primary education during their careers as 
junior officers to prepare them for mid-level command and 
staff, SEALs are offered none.  Now, more than ever, such a 
program is needed for SEAL junior officers.  
B. AREAS OF EMPHASIS NOTED BY THE STUDY 
This thesis found nineteen subjects that require 
improvement with regards to Naval Special Warfare junior 
officer education.  The figure below looks similar to the 
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findings from the JSOU (2005) report, and the reports thus 
serve to cross validate each other: 
 
– Mission planning at the 
platoon level  
– Tactical employment of 
organic NSWTU assets  
– Adjacent unit coordination 
and deconfliction 
– LNO skills to conventional 
and SOF staffs 
– Briefing, communication and 
public speaking  
– Technical knowledge of joint 
supporting assets 
– Combat advising and foreign 
internal defense  
– Fire support coordination and 
execution 
– Sniper and counter-sniper 
employment 
– Ground force commander roles 
and responsibilities 
– Integration of special 
activities 
– Psychological warfare 
– Information and net warfare 
– Joint doctrine 
– National security affairs and 
national security decision 
process 
– Theater planning 
– Language and culture 
– Insurgency and counter-
insurgency operations  
- Other government agency 
integration 
Figure 7.   Consolidated List of Naval Special Warfare 
Officer Survey Results Indicating Areas of Improvement 
 
This table represents subjects that were indicated to 
show significant correlation, subjects that demonstrated an 
officer’s desire for additional formal training and 
education vice solely on-the-job, and subjects that 
officer’s felt under prepared prior to deploying to a combat 
zone.    
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Complete Primary Education Block in Naval Special 
Warfare 
This study recommends that the Naval Special Warfare 
community develop a SEAL Lieutenants Career Course (SLCC) in 
order to enhance the Ensign to Lieutenant (O-1 to O-3) 
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Primary education block as prescribed in CJCSI 1800.01C.  
This program would be inherently connected to the existing 
SEAL officer pipeline and would compliment branch-qualifying 
education received through BUD/s, SQT and JOTC.  After 
branch qualifying, a SEAL officer would then gain the 
operational experience and knowledge afforded during an 
overseas deployment as an Assistant Officer-in-Charge (AOIC) 
of a SEAL Platoon.  After completing the AOIC tour, a SEAL 
officer would then be eligible to attend SLCC prior to 
assuming command of a deployable SEAL platoon.  Specifics 
are as follows: 
• Eligibility for SLCC includes BUD/s, JOTC, SQT and 
completion of tour as AOIC. 
• Officer does not have to be in OIC tour or have 
orders to an OIC tour.  An eligible SEAL officer 
could attend SLCC TAD during diversity tour after 
completion of AOIC tour. 
• SLCC should be a mandatory requirement prior to 
deploying as a SEAL Platoon Commander. 
• SLCC should be open to all service SOF officers 
with equivalent rank, experience, and job 
description in order to strengthen ties with SOF 
counterparts and gain knowledge from peers in 
different SOF occupations. 
• SLCC should be succinct enough to address the 19 
areas identified in this study.  SLCC should be 
offered twice a year at the NAVSPECWARCEN and co-
managed by the Center for SEAL and SWCC and the 
NAVSPECWARCEN PME office. 
• SLCC would be a graded course with ranked 
graduates, providing continued feedback to the 
student regarding progress and retained 
information. 
• SLCC should include an interagency and DoD tour to 
familiarize junior officers with the structure of 
the joint military process. 
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This recommendation includes a partnership with the 
Joint Special Operations University, the Naval Postgraduate 
School, and applicable service institutions for instruction, 
guidance and expertise.  Though managed, scheduled, and 
directed by the SEAL community, the SLCC program would rely 
heavily on outsourced educators to maintain relevance and 
up-to-date information.  Naval Special Warfare Leadership 
would use this course, as in the current Platoon Commander’s 
seminar, to emphasize SEAL command expectations, ethos, 
ethics, roles and responsibilities.  The curriculum of the 
program must be designed to specifically address the 
subjects indicated in the table above. 
Commander Matt Stevens’ (2007) thesis maintained a 
similar recommendation: 
A long term proposal is to develop a career-level 
course directed and taught by organic NSW assets 
targeting SEALs prior to their platoon commander 
tours.  Though not immediately feasible due to 
limited resources and organizational structure, 
it would be very possible to implement this 
concept within a year. (2007, p. 22) 
The ability to stand up such a program in a short 
period of time is debatable; of more concern and requiring 
more in-depth future analysis would be the short- and long-
term funding.  The requirement of such a program is obvious.  
As CDR Stevens (2007) recommended, other service 
institutions could be relied upon in the interim to educate 
junior officers, however; given the operational tempo of 
SEAL officers, this research recommends that the SEAL 
Lieutenants Career Course be initiated immediately.   
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2. Take Advantage of Existing Educational 
Opportunities  
This study recommends that the JSOU Warfighter 
Certificate become a mandatory qualification for all 
officers prior to an assignment as an Operations Officer, 
Task Unit Commander, or Troop Commander.  Specifics include: 
• Eligibility for Warfighter Certificate modules 
should mirror that of SLCC, except that officers 
within their AOIC tour would also eligible.  
• Courses can be taken out of order as long as all 
three are completed prior to above-mentioned 
assignment. 
• The Warfighter Certificate should also become a 
mandatory requirement for all SEAL officers prior 
to assignment as an Operations Officer, Task Unit 
Commander, or Troop Commander. 
3. Temporarily Assign Junior Officers to Deployed 
Staff 
Many of the written responses to the SEAL officer 
survey indicated that experience on an overseas, operational 
staff was invaluable.  Though probably best managed by 
individual unit commanders, every effort should be made to 
forward-deploy junior officers to staff positions under the 
leadership and direction of a mentor.  Significant thought 
and planning should go into this effort, as it is 
detrimental to the community to place an inexperienced and 
uneducated SEAL junior officer in a situation in which he is 
expected to represent Naval Special Warfare and (more 
importantly) other operators in the field.  Far too often, 
junior SEAL officers are placed in staff and liaison 
positions without proper preparation.   The end result can  
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have long-term negative impacts if that command or staff 
felt the SEAL junior officer was not up to operational 
standards.  
4. Maximize Attendance at Naval Postgraduate School 
As of Fall 2007, seven SEAL officers are currently 
enrolled in the Defense Analysis Curriculum at the Naval 
Postgraduate School out of approximately 150 students.  The 
unique, SOF-specific education opportunities provided by NPS 
DA are the only type or one of their kind offered to SEAL 
officers.   SEAL junior officer would not have to wait to be 
an O-4 in order to attend Naval War College and could, in 
fact, receive orders to NPS during his prescribed diversity 
tour.  The other career progression option is to attend NPS 
after an OIC or TUCDR tour.  Additionally, JPME-1 is built 
into the system; therefore, joint education requirements are 
addressed in tandem with the NPS Defense Analysis program. 
5. Formally Address Pre-commissioning Opportunities 
at USNA  
The Naval Special Warfare community would benefit from 
taking a more active role in developing SEAL officers prior 
to commissioning.  Specifically, NAVSPECWARCOM should 
institute a formal relationship with the SEAL officers 
responsible for the SEAL curriculum assigned to the United 
States Naval Academy to provide direction and assistance.  
NAVSPECWARCOM should provide representation at every officer 
“career night.”  NAVSPECWARCOM should monitor the progress 
of interested midshipmen in order to ensure educational 
opportunities are taken advantage of prior to graduation 
from USNA.  
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D. AREAS OF RECOMMENDED FURTHER STUDY 
1. Expansion of Branch Qualifying Training and 
Education 
Further study should consider the impacts of SEAL 
junior officers attending either the U.S. Marine Infantry 
Officer Course or the U.S. Army’s Infantry Officer Basic 
Course after completing BUD/s and SQT. By including an 
additional block of small-unit infantry tactics amongst 
their peers, SEAL officers could benefit from a more solid 
base of training and education that would further enhance 
their operational experiences as junior officers. 
2. Enlisted Education  
Upholding the long tradition of SEAL officers training 
alongside enlisted counterparts, it is time for the Naval 
Special Warfare community to place a strong emphasis on 
enlisted education.  The JSOU Warfighter Certificate is 
specifically designed for senior, Non-commissioned officers, 
warrants, and junior officers within the SOF community.  An 
analysis should be conducted to determine if there is value 
in making the JSOU Warfigher Certificate a requirement for 
enlisted SEALs prior to assuming the position as Operations 
Chief Petty Officer, Task Unit Chief Petty Officer, or Troop 
Chief Petty Officer. 
3. Distant Learning Qualification 
The Surface Warfare community has recently gone to a 
CD-based qualification system that requires junior officers 
to demonstrate a specified number of tasks, conditions, and 
standards as part of the surface warfare qualification 
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process.  Naval Special Warfare should look into the 
effectiveness and applicability of such a system to measure 
SEAL junior officer development. 
4. Develop a System to Address Pre-commissioning 
Education Opportunities for ROTC and OCS 
Similar to the situation at the Naval Academy, officers 
that join the community from ROTC and OCS should have a 
structured and monitored accession process in order to 
ensure that all education opportunities applicable to the 
SEAL and SOF community are made available and are taken 
advantage of. 
E. SUMMARY 
The nineteen areas for improvement identified by this 
research will not be difficult to address with the right 
diligence, time, money, and effort.  Most importantly, the 
SEAL community must maintain proficiency in the areas 
covered by this study that were reported to be doing well.  
SEALs today continue to go into harm’s way on a daily basis.  
SEAL officers are expected to lead their men into combat.  
As important as battlefield leadership is the responsibility 
of a SEAL officer to relate those combat experiences to the 
broader and more strategic warfare continuum.  SEAL officers 
will do their people a disservice if their combat efforts do 
not yield results beyond what is achieved on the 
battlefield.  Simply maneuvering a SEAL unit across the 
landscape is no longer the benchmark of a successful 
officer.  Though he must be a master of combat leadership, 
he must be a warrior diplomat, an operational and strategic 
thinker and planner. He must also maintain the ability to 
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communicate effectively with both conventional and other SOF 
assets.  The current SEAL junior officer education process 
does not prepare a SEAL officer for those requirements.  To 
suggest that SEALs receive all the education they need is to 
insinuate that there is nothing left to be learned.  No one 
in the Naval Special Warfare is prepared to make such a 
statement.  SEALs continue to strive for excellence through 
diligence, innovation, and hard work.  Therefore, there is a 
requirement for applicable and relevant education to better 
prepare junior officers.    Clearly, now, more than ever, is 
the time for a structured Naval Special Warfare junior 
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APPENDIX 1. SEAL OFFICER SURVEY 
Introduction:  You are invited to participate in a study entitled 
Structuring Naval Special Warfare Officer Professional Development 
Requirements being conducted by Naval Special Warfare.   
 
Procedures:  Please be frank and honest.  This survey should take no 
more than 15 minutes for O-1 to O-3’s and 30 minutes for O-4’s to O-5’s.  
Space will be provided for additional written/typed comments.  There is 
an additional set of questions after the short answer for O-4’s and O-
5’s. 
 
Risks and Benefits:  This project does not involve greater than minimal 
risk and involves no known reasonably foreseeable risks or hazards 
greater than those encountered in everyday life.  Benefits of the survey 
include a better understanding by the researcher of opinions and 
attitudes within the Naval Special Warfare community regarding 
Professional Development. 
 
Compensation:  There will be no tangible compensation provided for 
taking this survey.  The results of the survey will be available by 
contacting CDR (ret) Brad Voigt at the Naval Special Warfare Center for 
SEAL and SWCC. 
 
Confidentiality & Privacy Act: All records of this study will be kept 
private.  No information will be publicly accessible which could 
identify participants. This survey will be identified only as a code 
number on all research forms/data bases.  Any records of participation 
will be maintained by CENSEALSWCC for three years, after which they will 
be destroyed.   
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study.  Participation is strictly voluntary. If 
you agree to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time without 
prejudice.   
 
Points of Contact.  If there are any questions or comments regarding 
this project upon the completion of participation, contact the Principal 
Investigator, Dr. Erik Jansen, Naval Postgraduate School, or researcher 
LCDR Thomas A. Donovan, Naval Postgraduate School.  Any other questions 
or concerns may be addressed to the IRB Chair, LT Brent Olde, Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
 
Statement of Consent. I have been provided with a full explanation of 
the purpose, procedures, and duration of participation in this research 
project. I understand how my identification will be safeguarded and have 
had all my questions answered.  I have been provided a copy of this form 
for my records and I agree to participate in this study. I understand 
that by agreeing to participate in this research I do not waive any of 







Why the survey? 
 
Purpose & Background:  Purpose of this survey is to help determine where 
our community is excelling or falling behind with regards to officer 
professional development, specifically in two categories: training and 
education.  The results of this survey could help shape a framework for 
professional development from tactical to educational, from ensign to 
admiral.   
 
Every Squadron After-action Report since 2003 has listed Professional 
Development and/or Professional Military Education (PME) as a problem 
area.  Usually the item is vague with little elaboration.  This survey 
will gather information exclusively on Professional Development: 
Training and Education to allow a systematic analysis of what PRODEV and 
PME requirements should be focused toward NAVSPECWAR junior officers (O-
1 to O-4). 
 
Wording:  The term “schoolhouse” will be used for education or training 
received at any institution or training command.  Examples include, but 
are not limited to:  Naval Special Warfare Center Advanced Training, 
Joint Special Operations University, Navy/Army War College, Army Command 
and Staff, Special Warfare Center, and civilian institutions.  The 
converse of “schoolhouse” situation is on-the-job training: either 
through experience, work-ups, or turnover.  You will be asked the best 
place for learning: on the job training (OJT) or formal school-house 
(Formal) or some mix of the two.  The scale will range as follows: 
 
How skill was obtained:         
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
 
Questions will be asked on a ranged scale from 5 to 1 as described 
below: 
 
Scale for Questions: 
5 = Strongly Agree 
4 = Agree 
3 = Neither Agree or Disagree 
2 = Disagree 





Rank    O-1 O-2 O3 O-4 O-5  
 
1.  Most of my SEAL education and training has been in a formal school-
house environment. 
5(Strongly Agree) 4(Agree) 3(Neither) 2(Disagree) 1(Strongly Disagree)  
 
2.  Most of my SEAL education and experience has been on-the-job 
training (OJT). 
  5 4 3 2 1  
 
I feel that I am (was) properly indoctrinated and prepared to go to war 
with the following tactical skill sets: 
 
3. Fire and Maneuver (small unit tactics SEAL platoon and below)  
5  4  3  2  1      
a. How skill was obtained:       
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
 
4. Mission Planning at Platoon Level                                    
5  4  3  2  1       
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
 
5. Small Unit Tactics (SEAL platoon to Task Unit) 
5  4  3  2  1   
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
            
6. Tactical Employment of Organic NSWTU Assets    
5  4  3  2  1 
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
                 
7. Adjacent Unit Coordination and Deconfliction    
5  4  3  2  1    
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
        
8. LNO Skills to Conventional & SOF Staffs     
5  4  3  2  1            
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
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OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
      
9. Briefing, Communication, Public Speaking Skills    
5  4  3  2  1   
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
   
10. Technical Knowledge of Joint Supporting Assets    
5  4  3  2  1       
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
 
11. Combat Advising and Foreign Internal Defense (FID)   
5  4  3  2  1         
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
        
12. Other Government Agency Integration     
5  4  3  2  1      
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
            
13. Fire Support Coordination and Execution     
5  4  3  2  1                 
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
 
14. Organic/Attached Heavy Weapons Employment    
5  4  3  2  1                 
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
 
15. Sniper/Counter-sniper Employment     
5  4  3  2  1                 
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
 
16. Ground Force CDR Roles and Responsibilities     
5  4  3  2  1                 
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
 81
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
 
17. Integration of Special Activities      
5  4  3  2  1                 
a. How skill was obtained:        
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
b. How skill should be obtained:     
OJT   100   75/25   50/50   25/75   100   Formal 
 
18.  I feel that I am (was) properly indoctrinated and prepared to go to 
war with knowledge in the following areas: 
 
a. Guerilla Warfare      5  4  3  2  1                 
b. Insurgency and Counter Insurgency   5  4  3  2  1                 
c. Terrorism and Counter Terrorism    5  4  3  2  1                 
d. Information & Network Warfare    5  4  3  2  1                 
e. Psychological Warfare     5  4  3  2  1                 
f. Military Decision-making Process    5  4  3  2  1                 
g. Joint Doctrine       5  4  3  2  1                 
h. National Security Affairs/National Security Decision Process 
         5  4  3  2  1                 
i. Theater Planning      5  4  3  2  1                 
j. SOF History       5  4  3  2  1                 




19.  If you could add additional block(s) of instruction, training or 
education, to a JO’s career path to better prepare him for combat, what 
would it/they be? 
 
20.  If you could add additional block(s) of instruction, training or 
education, to a JO’s career path to better prepare him for staff, LNO, 
and eventual command position, what would it/they be? 
 
21.  What would you suggest as “other” ways to educate junior officers 
in NAVSPECWAR community? 
 
22.  If the community developed a Division Officers Course (pre-Platoon 
Commander), how long should it be?  Highlight one: 
 
Not Required     Less than one month  1-2 month   3-4 months  5-6 months 
 
**If you are an O-1, O-2 or O-3, you have completed this survey.  
Results will be presented to NAVSPECWARCOM by the Fall 2007.** 
 





For O-4’s and O-5’s: 
 
23.  The officers under my command (platoon/task unit/squadron) are 
(were) indoctrinated and prepared to go to war in the following areas: 
 
a. Guerilla Warfare      5  4  3  2  1                 
b. Insurgency and Counter Insurgency   5  4  3  2  1                 
c. Terrorism and Counter Terrorism    5  4  3  2  1                 
d. Information & Network Warfare    5  4  3  2  1                 
e. Psychological Warfare     5  4  3  2  1                 
f. Military Decision-making Process    5  4  3  2  1                 
g. Joint Doctrine       5  4  3  2  1                 
h. National Security Affairs/National Security Decision Process  
         5  4  3  2  1                 
i. Theater Planning      5  4  3  2  1                 
j. SOF History       5  4  3  2  1 
k. Civil Affairs       5  4  3  2  1                  
 
24.  The officers under my command (platoon/task unit/squadron) are 
(were) indoctrinated and prepared to go to war in the following areas: 
 
a. Fire and Maneuver (small unit tactics SEAL platoon and below)     
5  4  3  2  1      
b. Mission Planning at platoon level                                    
5  4  3  2  1       
c. Small Unit Tactics (SEAL platoon to Task Unit)    
5  4  3  2  1   
d. Tactical Employment of Organic NSWTU assets    
5  4  3  2  1 
e. Adjacent Unit Coordination and Deconfliction    
5  4  3  2  1    
f. LNO skills to conventional & SOF staffs     
5  4  3  2  1            
g. Briefing, Communication, Public-speaking Skills    
5  4  3  2  1   
h. Technical knowledge of Joint Supporting Assets    
5  4  3  2  1       
i. Combat Advising and Foreign Internal Defense (FID)   
5  4  3  2  1         
j. Other Government Agency Integration     
5  4  3  2  1      
k. Fire Support Coordination and Execution     
5  4  3  2  1 
l. Organic/Attached Heavy Weapons Employment    
5  4  3  2  1                 
m. Sniper/Counter-sniper Employment     
5  4  3  2  1                 
n. Ground Force CDR Roles and Responsibilities     
5  4  3  2  1   
o. Integration of Special Activities 




APPENDIX 2. SURVEY RESULTS 
Question Response       Standard   
Number out of 129 Mean Median Mode Deviation P-Value 
1 129 2.2016 2 2 0.9793 0.556 
2 129 4.2558 4 4 0.8318 0.934 
3 129 4.4651 5 5 0.5869 0.785 
3a 129 3.876 4 4 0.9763 0.332 
3b 128 3.5859 4 4 0.9351 0.358 
4 128 3.8984 4 4 1.0487 0.791 
4a 129 3.8372 4 4 0.8731 0.059 
4b 129 3.1705 3 3 0.7616 0.043 
5 126 4.1587 4 4 0.7737 0.395 
5a 129 4.0388 4 4 0.922 0.156 
5b 127 3.5039 4 4 0.7546 0.464 
6 124 3.6935 4 4 0.9892 0.076 
6a 125 4.248 5 5 0.9559 0.071 
6b 126 3.3651 3 3 0.7332 0.534 
7 127 2.976 3 2 1.172 0.657 
7a 127 4.6457 5 5 0.7403 0.145 
7b 127 3.2126 3 3 0.752 0.917 
8 127 3.102 3 4 1.194 0.515 
8a 129 4.7132 5 5 0.7725 0.168 
8b 129 3.2558 3 3 0.8128 0.819 
9 127 3.7559 4 4 1.0135 0.305 
9a 129 4.0775 4 5 0.9405 0.172 
9b 129 3.0388 3 3 0.7438 0.09 
10 127 3.1575 3 4 1.1228 0.196 
10a 129 4.2868 5 5 0.9202 0.473 
10b 129 3 3 3 0.75 0.408 
11 126 3.167 3 4 1.178 0.242 
11a 127 4.7165 5 5 0.6286 0.14 
11b 127 3.4488 3 3 0.6867 0.104 
12 126 2.754 3 2 1.288 0.231 
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12a 126 4.4841 5 5 0.9528 0.026 
12b 127 3.2047 3 3 0.6707 1 
13 127 3.3386 4 4 1.1071 0.4 
13a 129 3.9922 4 5 1.0193 0.003 
13b 129 3.2016 3 3 0.7539 0.079 
14 127 3.5512 4 4 1.0962 0.482 
14a 128 4.0469 4 5 1.093 0.12 
14b 128 3.4766 4 4 0.763 0.313 
15 127 3.504 4 4 1.154 0.162 
15a 125 4.256 5 5 0.9747 0.672 
15b 127 3.4567 3 4 0.71 0.224 
16 126 3.524 4 4 1.15 0.753 
16a 127 4.4173 5 5 0.8493 0.14 
16b 127 3.378 3 3 0.7119 0.055 
Question Response       Standard P 
Number out of 129 Mean Median Mode Deviation Value 
17 127 3.134 3 4 1.164 0.489 
17a 127 4.3228 5 5 1.0303 0.003 
17b 127 3.1654 3 3 0.6757 0.321 
        
18a 129 3.3643 4 4 1.1315 0.995 
18b 129 3.2946 3 4 1.0854 0.816 
18c 129 3.6047 4 4 1.0564 0.22 
18d 129 2.5659 3 2 1.0595 0.691 
18e 129 2.4651 2 2 1.0387 0.763 
18f 129 3.535 4 4 1.139 0.752 
18g 128 3.117 3 4 1.195 0.055 
18h 129 2.969 3 2 1.218 0.014 
18i 129 2.953 3 4 1.198 0.022 
18j 129 3.5039 4 4 1.0087 0.627 
18k 128 2.5859 3 3 1.1261 0.404 
22 126 2.8095 3 3 0.8071 0.25 
Question Response    Standard P 
Number out of 57 Mean Median Mode Deviation Value 
23a 55 2.964 3 4 1.071 0.732 
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23b 55 2.945 3 3 1.026 0.778 
23c 55 3.527 4 4 1.136 0.462 
23d 55 2.309 2 2 0.92 0.732 
23e 55 2.091 2 2 0.888 0.473 
23f 53 3.113 3 4 0.934 0.751 
23g 55 2.618 3 2 1.009 0.079 
23h 55 2.345 2 2 1.004 0.336 
23i 53 2.453 2 2 1.011 0.601 
23j 55 3.018 3 3 0.991 0.452 
23k 55 2.182 2 2 0.884 0.886 
24a 55 4.4 5 5 0.83 0.249 
24b 55 4.036 4 4 0.942 0.111 
24c 55 4.273 4 4 0.781 0.514 
24d 54 3.87 4 4 0.891 0.644 
24e 55 3.182 3 3 1.02 0.672 
24f 54 2.907 3 3 1.033 0.836 
24g 55 3.364 3 4 1.025 0.568 
24h 53 2.943 3 4 1.008 0.773 
24i 55 3 3 3 0.981 0.776 
24j 54 2.611 3 3 0.998 0.65 
24k 55 3.273 4 4 0.99 0.607 
24l 54 3.611 4 4 0.92 0.671 
24m 54 3.796 4 4 0.898 0.367 
24n 55 3.473 4 4 1.034 0.783 
24o 55 2.945 3 3 1.044 0.781 
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APPENDIX 5. NS425 SYLLABUS 
NS425 AY2008           NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE OFFICER PRACTICUM TOPICS 
 
1  Course Introduction and Introduction to Naval Special Warfare  
  Community 
 
2  PPT’s “NSW Command Structure”  
 
3 Decision Making for JO (articles)  
  -TDG #1 
 
4     Administrative Requirements for junior officers (Orders, PPT, 
Awards, Evals/Fitreps, Naval Writing Guide, Pay, Travel 
Claims), Officer Resources (Bupers, DFAS, NKO) 
 
5 NSW Officer Lessons Learned (guest speaker, TBD) 
 
6 Officer and Chief Relationships, role of JO, unit dynamics 
 
7 SHOOT-NSW Weaponry Introduction/Range Day 
 




10    Medical—Health, nutrition, combat care 
 
11    DOD Areas of Operations, Geography  
 
12    Mission Planning, Tasking for Pre-BUD/S Screener 
 -TDG #2  
 
13    Tasking for Spec Ops History Research Paper and Presentation, 
Midterm Quiz (Geography, NSW Org, Admin, Shoot, Move, 
Communicate, etc…),  
 
14    NSW Officer Lessons Learned (guest speaker TBD)  
 
15 Public Speaking lesson/practical 
 
16 Pre BUD/S Screener Brief/Execution 
 
17 Spec Ops History Research presentation 
 
18 Spec Ops History Research presentation  
 
19 Spec Ops History Research presentation 
 
20 Spec Ops History Research presentation, Course Wrap-up 
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